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NOTES
Evidence-Expert Testimony: Admissibility of Human Factors
Testimony Under the Federal Rules of Evidence
In recent years courts have liberalized the standards for admission of ex-
pert testimony. Federal Rules of Evidence 702 through 705 reflect this trend
and are now in effect in many states as well as in the federal court system.I To
be admissible under the rules, expert testimony need only assist the trier of
fact.2 Furthermore, a qualified expert is allowed to give opinions on ultimate
issues, 3 which were previously reserved for determination by the trier of fact.
Certain ultimate issues, including conclusions concerning whether a particular
legal standard is satisfied, are still inappropriate for expert testimony, how-
ever, because simply telling the jury the result to reach does not constitute
assistance. Moreover, when the mode of analysis applied by an expert lacks
scientific reliability, there is a further danger that the expert's testimony will
not assist but, instead, mislead. Human-factors analysis testimony demon-
strates both of these dangers.
According to a practitioner in the field, human-factors analysis is the
"study of all the factors which combine to influence the decision of the indi-
vidual, such as past experience, present feelings, and immediate motor re-
sponse in terms of the present situation or environment."4 In a line of recent
Florida cases involving railroad crossing accidents,5 several psychologists and
engineers have qualified as human factors experts and have been permitted to
give their opinions on the probable behavior of the average or reasonable per-
son in the actual accident settings. Assuming human-factors testimony satis-
fies the threshold test of assistance to the jury, the Florida courts nevertheless
have failed to consider qualifications of the proferred experts adequately, ne-
glected to determine whether human-factors analysis is scientifically reliable
and overlooked the problem that expert testimony on the behavior of a reason-
able person is not permitted even under the present ultimate issue rule.6
I. The Federal Rules of Evidence took effect in United States courts on July 1, 1975. Pub.
L. No. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975). Twenty-one states have adopted these rules with omis-
sions and variations. Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (state correlation tables) (1981).
2. Fed. R. Evid. 702.
3. Id. 704.
4. Public Health Foundation v. Cole, 352 So. 2d 877, 879 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977), cert.
denied, 361 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1978). The witness provided this explanation of human engineering,
his subspecialty. Another human-factors specialist has defined his field as the study of how a
human uses and interacts with his products. Fowler, Human Factors Analysis, 10 Trial, Nov.-
Dec. 1974, at 53. "Products" presumably refers to items such as consumer goods found in the
home and more complicated devices like automobiles.
5. See text accompanying notes 7-41 infra.
6. The Florida legislature substantially adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1976.
Law of June 23, 1976, ch. 76-237, 1976 Fla. Laws 556. The Florida Evidence Code appears in
chapter 90 of the State statutes. Fla. Stit. Ann. (West 1979). The Florida evidence rules substan-
tially follow the federal rules but contain numerous variations; omissions and additions. 13
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The line of Florida decisions in which human factors testimony was of-
fered began in 1971 with Seaboard Coast Line Railroad v. Hill In that case
decedent's automobile automobile crashed into the side of a train on an ex-
tremely dark, foggy night. Neither a flagman nor flares had been posted at the
crossing. Plaintiff alleged negligent operation of the train; defendant denied
this charge and counterclaimed contributory negligence. 8 At trial a human-
factors psychologist who had never seen the crossing or the decedent 9 testified
that an average driver would not have been able to gather adequate informa-
tion to react properly to the obstruction on the tracks. In reaching this conclu-
sion, the expert contended that the darkness, fog, absence of flares and absence
of sound would create perceptual problems for a driver.' 0
The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the judge did not abuse his
discretion in concluding that the expert was qualified.' To decide whether
the subject matter was appropriate for expert testimony, the court examined
the expert's explanation of the causes of the perceptual difficulties. The court
concluded that "the subject matter of the opinion was not just the visibility of
the train on the crossing, but also the deceptive quality of various factors that
were present in the environment . . . , and the manner in which a person
would react to these factors."' 12 Such reactions could be found to lie beyond
the scope of the jurors' common knowledge and within the expert's sphere of
expertise. Finally, the court held that even if the decision to admit the expert
testimony was erroneous, there was sufficient independent evidence supporting
the jury's conclusion that the defendant was negligent to render the error
harmless.' 3
Four years later a different panel of the same court ruled that a human-
factors expert's opinion about the behavior of an average man in given cir-
cumstances was improperly admitted. In Seaboard Coast Line Railroad v.
KubalskiM4 decedent's truck was stopped, during the day, on railroad tracks,
despite the presence of numerous warning devices.15 The court distinguished
U.L.A. 213 (1980). Differences involving expert testimony, however, are minor. The Florida Evi-
dence Code did not take effect until July 1, 1979. Law of June 21, 1978, ch. 78-379, § 1, 1978 Fla.
Laws 1052. Therefore, none of the human-factors decisions applied the federal rules in determin-
ing the admissibility of and limits on 'testimony in this area.
7. 250 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (2-1 decision), writ discharged, 270 So. 2d
359 (Fla. 1972).
8. Id. at 313-15. In each of the Florida cases examined in this Note, plaintiffs employed
human-factors witnesses to demonstrate that there was no contributory negligence.
9. Id. at 314.
10. Id. at 315. Contra, St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Jackson, 242 Ark. 858, 416 S.W.2d 273
(1967) (factors such as position of the sun, elements distracting to motorists, weather and obstruc-
tions to vision are individually within the comprehension of the average juror); Owre v. Crown
Zellerbach Corp., 260 Or. 454, 490 P.2d 504 (1971) (expert testimony not permitted because the
distracting influences were hazards to good vision encountered regularly by motorists).
11. 250 So. 2d at 314. This decision to qualify the witness as an expert is criticized in text
accompanying notes 54-58 infra.
12. Id. at 315.
13. Id.
14. 323 So.2d 32 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
15. Id. at 33.
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Hill by contending that the environmental conditions in that case amounted to
"extraordinary circumstances." Noting the absence of unusual circumstances,
the Kubalski court held that "inroads upon the province of the jury to decide
what the reasonable man should do" were unwarranted. 16 Because the testi-
mony by the human-factors expert, a president of a safety consulting firm,
may have significantly affected the jury's allocation of negligence, the court
further determined that the admission of this testimony was not harmless er-
ror. 17
In the only case not involving a railroad crossing accident, the trial court
in Public Health Foundation v. Cole 18 upheld the admissibility of human-fac-
tors testimony. Plaintiff was injured on the Fourth of July while diving into a
river on defendant's property. The accident occurred late in the afternoon as
the tide was receding; no warnings were posted about the presence of danger-
ous diving conditions at low tide.' 9 Plaintiff testified, however, that she had
intimate knowledge of the location of the accident and of most of the environ-
mental factors affecting the area. Furthermore, she had observed that the tide
was going out swiftly that afternoon, to the extent that she could "see shallow
places and deep places."20
When asked a hypothetical question posed in this factual context, Dr.
Isadore Scherer, the same expert witness who testified in Hill, concluded that a
reasonably prudent individual could have this accident because of the nature
of the situation and the other described factors. 2 ' In addition to the factors
already mentioned, Dr. Scherer took into account three other conditions. By
analyzing a survey map of the area, Scherer noted that plaintiff may have been
bothered by glare from the sun, making it more difficult to judge the depth of
the water. Murky water would also interfere with determining depth. Finally,
Dr. Scherer thought that the occurrence of the accident on the Fourth of July
was a significant variable. Because it was a holiday, plaintiff was happy and
enjoying herself, therefore, she may have dived into the river faster than she
ordinarily would.22 In drawing these conclusions, Dr. Scherer utilized the
16. Id. at 34. The court contrasted "extraordinary circumstances" with ordinary ones to ex-
plain the admission of expert testimony in Hill. Ordinary circumstances would be found to be
within the competence of the jury; therefore, expert testimony oi such conditions would be
barred.
17. Id. Decedent had been found 60% negligent, and the railroad 40% negligent. Were it not
for the prejudicial testimony, decedent's negligence might have been found to be even greater.
18. 352 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (2-1 decision) (none of the judges had been
on either the Hill or Kubalski panel) cert. denied, 361 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1978).
19. Id. at 879.
20. Id. at 880. When asked why the accident happened, plaintiff replied, "I don't know. I
guess I just didn't pay enough attention to the depth of the water." Id.
21. Id. at 880-81.
22. Id. at 881. With respect to plaintiffs intimate knowledge of the area, the expert noted
that habit inference would have downgraded her alertness to the situation, concluding that this
was another reason that a reasonably prudent person could have had the same accident. Id. On
the other hand, some courts have reasoned that familiarity with the scene of the accident makes it
more likely that the party is negligent. See, e.g., Owre v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 260 Or. 454,
490 P.2d 504 (1971) (testimony by consulting engineer regarding the difficulty of seeing traffic light
excluded since decedent knew of the light).
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deposition testimony of plaintiff and eyewitnesses, as well as photographs of
the scene of the accident and the survey map of the area.23
The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision to
admit Dr. Scherer's testimony, reasoning that the opinion testimony was re-
lated to the deceptive quality of factors present in the environment. 24 This is
the same justification that the Hill court propounded.2- Since the environ-
mental conditions created a situation that may have been beyond the ordinary
experience and understanding of the jury, the Cole court determined that ex-
pert testimony was appropriate.26
Although the Cole decision gives further support to admission of human-
factors testimony, the panel there came very close to setting aside the Hill
precedent. The concurring judge considered the decision in Hill an "unhappy
one" but reluctantly followed it because it was a precedent of his own court.
27
Believing that opinions on whether a party's conduct was negligent completely
usurp the jury's function, the judge did not think that the harmless error rule
could justify the decision. Because Dr. Scherer had concluded that a reason-
able person could have had this accident, the judge reasoned that the jury may
have been persuaded to ignore other evidence in finding Mrs. Cole totally free
of negligence.28
Finally, the most recent Florida case that considered the admissibility of
human-factors testimony, Seaboard Coast Line Railroad v. Buchman,29 in-
volved a complicated intersection of railroad tracks and highways, and the
questionable audibility of the train whistle. Even though the train's
headlamps were on and its bell had been ringing continuously, decedent had
never slowed while approaching the crossing.30 The trial judge admitted testi-
mony given by two human-factors experts. The first expert, Frank Fowler,
testified that a number of "confusion factors" were present at the crossing.
These included the multiple intersections of highways and crossings, the slight
incline of the railroad crossing and the restricted view of the tracks because of
an orange grove.31 The second expert, Norman Korobow, stated that eighty to
eighty-seven percent of the population would not have been able to hear the
whistle, a conclusion he based on the facts in evidence, including the velocity
of the wind on the day of the accident. 32
23. 352 So. 2d at 881.
24. Id. at 879.
25. 250 So. 2d at 315. See text accompanying notes 11-13 supra.
26. 352 So. 2d at 879. Physical conditions that the court mentioned included the angle of the
sun, glare, the tide and overall weather conditions.
27. Id. at 882.
28. Id.
29. 358 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978), reversed, 381 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1980).
30. Id. at 837.
31. Id. at 840.
32. Id. Also, at the time of the accident, decedent had the car radio turned on and the win-
dows rolled up. Id. at 837.
A third expert, not a human-factors expert, testified about the absence of proper warning
devices at the crossing. Id. at 840-41. Similar testimony was excluded in Hill because it was
found to be within the comprehension of the jury. 250 So. 2d at 314.
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The Second District Court of Appeal reversed the lower court's determi-
nation of admissibility. Because it was particularly concerned with the preju-
dicial effect that improper expert testimony could have on the jury in this case
because there was no independent evidence of negligence on the part of the
railroad, the court held that the confusion factors were within the jury's expe-
rience.33 While mention of these factors would have been appropriate in the
closing argument of counsel, allowing Fowler to make these observations, in
the court's view, unduly influenced the jury and invaded its province.34 The
Buchman court rejected Korobow's testimony for a different reason. Because
of the absence of extraordinary circumstances, testimony concerning the abil-
ity of the general populace to hear the whistle was unwarranted. 35
The Florida Supreme Court reversed the court of appears decision in
Buchman in its first consideration 36 of the admissibility of human-factors testi-
mony. The court37 relied upon the Hill "deceptive quality of the environ-
ment" test and referred to the Kubalski unusual circumstances distinction, in
finding conditions sufficiently analogous to warrant expert testimony.38
Rather than invading the province of the jury, the expert testimony would
assist the jury in its deliberations. 39 The dissent maintained, however, that no
unusual circumstances existed; hence, the jury should have been free to draw
its own conclusions.4°
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Florida's test of
admissibility of expert testimony was whether the facts to be determined were
obscure and not within the ordinary experience of the jury. Florida courts
restricted admission to situations in which special knowledge or experience
was necessary to draw a valid conclusion.4 1 For this reason, courts consider-
ing the admissibility of human-factors testimony felt constrained to support
their decisions by showing that the particular facts evidenced "extraordinary
33. 358 So. 2d at 841-42.
34. Id. at 842. For explanation of the use of the phrase "invades the province of the jury,"
see C. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 12 (2d ed. 1972 & Supp. 1978).
35. 358 So. 2d at 842. The court questioned the reliability of Korobow's opinion, since his
testimony did not imply that the responsibility of motorists to be alert for trains was a factor given
consideration in his analysis. Id. at 840.
36. Trial courts allowed human-factors testimony in two cases that preceded Buchman to the
supreme court. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Welfare, 350 So. 2d 476 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1977), quashed, 373 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1979); Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Heliman, 330 So. 2d 761
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976), quashed, 349 So.2d 1187 (Fla. 1977). Neither the appellate nor the
supreme court opinion in Helman analyzes admissibility of the testimony. In Welfare, however,
the Florida Supreme Court considered the human-factors evidence as proper-in dicta--over the
dissent of Justice Alderman.
37. Buchman v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 381 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1980).
38. Id. at 230.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 231 (Alderman, J., dissenting). One of the two dissenting justices was, ironically,
Justice Alderman, who had written the Cole opinion while serving on the appellate court. His
dissent emphasized that the jury was fully competent to appreciate the conditions existing at the
time of the accident.
41. Mills v. Redwing Carriers, Inc., 127 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1961). The court
noted that if expert testimony were permitted in instances when the jury was competent, there was




circumstances" or a "deceptive quality of the environment." Either character-
istic would remove the subject matter from the ordinary experience of the jury.
The major difficulty, however, lies in determining what circumstances are ex-
traordinary. The Hill court noted such factors as darkness, fog, and absence
of flares in deciding that human-factors testimony was admissible. Arguably,
each of these conditions is well within the common knowledge of jurors.42
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 considerably simplifies this problem. As
long as the testimony will assist the jury, it is admissible.43 Under rule 702
expert testimony pertaining to a particular subject should be permitted when-
ever it will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining
a fact in issue.44 This is a more liberal standard than the traditional common
law requirement that the subject of the testimony must be beyond the compre-
hension of the average layman.45 Thus, under the statutory standard, even
though a layman has a fundamental grasp of a particular issue or subject, a
court may still permit expert testimony if it would provide additional aid to
the jury.46 When the trier of fact is as competent as the expert to evaluate an
issue, however, the use of expert testimony should be precluded. 47
The Florida Supreme Court advanced this assistance rationale when sup-
porting the trial judge's admission of expert testimony in Buchman,48 even
though the assistance test was not in effect at the time of the trial.49 As will be
seen below, it is doubtful that human-factors opinions genuinely help the jury
make a more informed decision than it could make on its own.50
Even if expert testimony would be helpful to interpret certain informa-
tion, the judge must still decide whether the prospective witness possesses the
42. See note 10 and accompanying text supra. Of course, one reason that human-factors
testimony may still be appropriate despite the jury's ability to comprehend the individual factors
is that multiple factors may combine to create an environment with which the jury is unfamiliar.
43. Fed. R. Evid. 702, Adv. Comm. Note.
44. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Masson, 582 F.2d 961 (5th Cir. 1978) (testimony of quali-
fied expert regarding gambling operations necessary to aid jury in understanding taped conversa-
tions in the jargon of this business).
45. See C. McCormick, supra note 34, § 13. Although North Carolina has yet to adopt the
federal rules, decisions of the state courts generally apply the federal standard. See, e.g., Hubbard
v. Quality Oil Co., 268 N.C. 489, 151 S.E.2d 71 (1966) (proper test is whether additional light can
be thrown on question under investigation by qualified expert). But see Glenn v. Smith, 264 N.C.
706, 142 S.E.2d 596 (1965) (testimony about the propensity of an automobile to fishtail not al-
lowed).
46. Holmgren v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 516 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1975) (witness with Ph.D. in
engineering mechanics and familiar with principles of agricultural machinery would have pro-
vided assistance to the jury concerning the defective design of a corn picker); Englehart v. Jeep
Corp., 122 Ariz. 256, 594 P.2d 510 (1979) (applying federal rules, court held that experts could
draw conclusions more precisely and scientifically than the average juror).
47. Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, (1962) (expert testimony may be excluded
iffjury is as capable of comprehending primary facts and drawing correct conclusions as are wit-
nesses who have had special training); Shell Oil Co. v. Gutierrez, 119 Ariz. 426, 581 P.2d 271 (Ct.
App. 1978) (jury as competent as an expert to determine whether the warning 'Flammable Liquid'
was adequate).
48. 381 So. 2d at 230.
49. Because the appellate decision came down in 1978, the trial must have occurred well
before the Florida Evidence Code took effect on July 1, 1979.
50. See text accompanying notes 58-84 infra.
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requisite knowledge, skill, experience, training or education to qualify as an
expert in his particular field.51 If the witness can assist the trier of fact, he
should qualify.5 2 Once the witness is classified as an expert, questions related
to his background and credibility affect the weight to be given his testimony,
not its admissibility.5 3
Of the four cases under consideration, only in Hill did the appellate court
analyze the qualifications of the human-factors witness. Presumably, this
question was not at issue in later cases because of the difficulty of establishing
that the trial judge abused his discretion, a condition for proving an admission
error.54 To support the trial court's admission of expert testimony, the Hill
court concluded from Dr. Scherer's testimony that he had considerable aca-
demic and practical experience in his field of psychology. Specifically, the
court referred to Dr. Scherer's statement that he had done "research relating to
motivation, attention, and other variables in personal history which relate to a
person's inability to work. . .[and] research into the subject of the requisite
knowledge and ability for the operation of machinery. '55 Neither operation
of machinery nor inability to work, however, seems to have any bearing on the
subject matter of the expert's testimony-the effect of certain environmental
factors on the perception of the average automobile driver. When an expert's
testimony departs from his field of knowledge, any further opinions may mis-
lead the trier of fact. Thus, courts must consider whether a witness qualifies as
an expert with respect to the subject matter of his proposed testimony.56 Al-
though Dr. Scherer would certainly qualify as an expert in his areas of spe-
cialty, the Hill court was not warranted in admitting his testimony without
establishing the relationship between his credentials and perception
problems.57 Neither an unqualified witness nor an expert testifying outside his
51. Fed. R. Evid. 702. See generally C. McCormick, supra note 34, § 13.
52. United States v. Lopez, 543 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1976) (trial judge made meaningful exam-
ination of psychologist's qualifications before excluding his testimony), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1111
(1977).
The tests for appropriateness of subject matter and qualifications of prospective experts are
apparently the same-assistance to the trier of fact. Thus, while expert testimony on a particular
topic may be appropriate, a particular expert witness may not be personally capable of providing
the requisite assistance.
53. United States v. Fortune, 513 F.2d 883, (5th Cir.), (trier of fact to determine questions of
credibility), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1020 (1975); Behm v. Division of Administration, 336 So. 2d
579 (Fla. 1976) (jury to decide credibility to be given expert testimony).
A court may still reject expert testimony if a reasonable basis for the opinions is not estab-
lished. For example, an accident reconstruction expert may not give an opinion on the point of
imact based solely on eyewitness testimony, since experts in this field generally require more
information to formulate an opinion. Fed. R. Evid. 703, Adv. Comm. Note.
54. Berdeaux v. Gamble Alden Life Ins. Co., 528 F.2d 987, 990 (5th Cir. 1976); Buchman v.
Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 381 So. 2d 229, 230 (Fla. 1980).
55. 250 So. 2d at 314. No other qualifications or explanations were given by the Hill court.
56. Perkins v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 596 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1979) (specialist in mechanical
engineering, who had no automobile design background, allowed to testify on general engineering
principles but not as an expert on automobile design). But cf. United States v. Viglia, 549 F.2d
335, (5th Cir.) (expert whose principal area of practice was pediatrics and who did not treat obes-
ity held to have sufficient medical training to testify on the use of controlled substances to treat
obesity), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977).
57. When expert testimony is based upon false assumptions, Florida courts have not always
1981]
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realm of expertise can provide the necessary assistance to the jury required
both by Florida's pre-Federal Rules test and by rule 702.
Although recognizing the importance of establishing the credentials of an
expert witness, the Florida courts totally failed to consider another crucial test
of admissibility of human-factors testimony-whether it qualifies as scientific
evidence.58 Not every ostensibly scientific technique should be recognized as
the foundation for expert testimony. The trier of fact may be unduly influ-
enced by an expert claiming a scientific basis for his opinion because of the
expert's apparent objectivity. Moreover, rebuttal of such an opinion can be
accomplished only through use of other experts or by cross-examination based
on a thorough acquaintance with the underlying principles. 59
If the state of the expert's field has not developed to the point that his
opinions have a reasonable scientific basis, the Federal Rules of Evidence do
not permit the testimony.60 Opinions that fail to satisfy this requirement can-
not furnish assistance to the jury as required by rule 702.61 Nevertheless, there
must be an opportunity for new fields of scientific and specialized knowledge
to be verified by courts as reliable. "[N]either newness nor lack of absolute
certainty suffices to render it inadmissible. . . . Every useful new develop-
ment must have its first day in court." 62 During that first day in court, how-
ever, the judge must scrutinize innovative developments before ruling that the
proferred expert testimony is admissible.63
Two recent decisions by federal courts of appeals analyze many of the
factors that should be considered when determining the admissibility of a new
scientific method. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in United
followed the rule that questions concerning the evidence go to its weight, not its admissiblity. See
E.R. Squibb and Sons, Inc. v. Stickney, 274 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (jury verdict
not sustained because expert's conclusion that a product was defective and unfit for its intended
use was unsupported by the facts; therefore, the testimony had no probative value), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 961 (1974).
58. See United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975).
See generally Comment, The Psychologist as Expert Witness: Science in the Courtroom, 38 Md.
L. Rev. 539 (1979).
59. United States v. Brady, 595 F.2d 359, 362-63 (6th Cir. 1979).
The traditional standard for admission of scientific evidence is promulgated in Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). For a scientific principle or discovery to be admissible, the
Frye test required that the principle "be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance
in the particular field in which it belongs." Id. at 1014.
Recent decisions have emphasized that reliability of the scientific technique is the most im-
portant factor in determining general acceptance. E.g., United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
60. United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381 (Ist Cir. 1979). See generally C. McCormick, supra
note 34, § 13.
61. Cf. United States v. Scavo, 593 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1979) (testimony must be helpful to the
trier of fact and is also subject to exclusion under rule 403 if it will confuse the issues).
62. United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 438 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994
(1971).
A scientific technique developed specifically for use in a particular trial may even be admissi-
ble, giving further credence to the view that reliability is the courts' major concern. See Cop-
polino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.) (expert testimony evaluating test developed
for trial to determine presence of poison in body of defendant's wife held admissible), appeal
dismissed, 234 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970).
63. See C. McCormick, supra note 34, § 203.
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States v. Williams,64 permitted spectrographic voice analysis65 to be presented
through expert testimony. The court emphasized the high percentage of suc-
cessful voice identifications as well as the expert's certification in his field and
extensive practical experience. The expert's opinion had a minimal potential
to mislead, since the jury could examine the objective components of the tests.
Finally, normal safeguards were available, including the opportunity to chal-
lenge the reliability of the equipment and the technique of analysis, and to
question the expert's qualifications.66
In United States v. Fosher6 7 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding a psycholo-
gist's testimony concerning the unreliability of eyewitness identifications. The
court reasoned that proof offered to assist the jury must provide a system of
analysis that will be reasonably likely to add to the common understanding of
a particular issue.68 Thus, an expert must give some indication of how he
reached his opinion. With no such system evident in Fosher, the court deter-
mined that the jury was as capable of assessing an eyewitness' ability to per-
ceive and remember an assailant as the proffered expert. The Fosher court
upheld the trial court's conclusion that the expert testimony was not "suffi-
ciently beyond the ken of lay jurors to satisfy Rule 702."69 Moreover, admis-
sion of opinions based on scientific subject matter of unproven reliability
would raise a substantial danger of prejudice, given the aura of reliability sur-
rounding scientific evidence. 70
Florida courts have reached the same conclusion in excluding opinions on
the unreliability of eyewitness identification. In Nelson v. State7l the expert
never examined the victim of an attack who had subsequently identified her
assailant. The trial court rejected testimony concerning factors that might af-
fect perception and the memory process in general. On review, the appellate
court supported this exclusion, observing that the expert's opinion was largely
comprised of hypotheses, theories, generalization and speculation.72 Courts in
64. 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978).
65. This is commonly known as voiceprint identification. It involves examination of spectro-
graphic representations of the human voice, with the skill of the examiner being the critical f ctor
in the degree of success. C. McCormick, supra note 34, § 204, at 489 n.31. See generally Kamine,
The Voiceprint Technique, 6 San Diego L. Rev. 213 (1969).
66. 583 F.2d at 1198-1200. But see People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478
(1966) (even extensive qualifications of the expert in the fields of speech and acoustical engineer-
ing may be insufficient to justify admissibility).
67. 590 F.2d 381 (lst Cir. 1979).
68. Id. at 383. The court was obviously concerned that expert testimony in this area could be
quite arbitrary. If the jury does not have a means to interpret the testimony, it is apparent that the
expert opinions will be of no assistance.
69. Id. at 383.
70. The court held that, "[q]uite apart from questions of limited relevance and reliability,"
rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows the trial court to exclude evidence whose proba-
tive value is outweighed by the danger of confusion and prejudice. Id. The possibility of
prejudice in criminal cases, such as Fosher, may also raise constitutional questions about the right
of a defendant to a fair trial.
71. 362 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
72. Id. at 1021.
19811
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other jurisdictions have generally concurred.73
Many of these weaknesses are found in the human-factors cases. For ex-
ample, there is no evidence that any of the witnesses had firsthand knowledge
of the settings of the accidents. At best they developed familiarity by studying
photographs and survey maps,74 at worst through an attorney's recitation of
facts in a hypothetical question.75 As in Nelson, the expert opinions dealt not
with the perceptions and reactions of the specific person involved in the acci-
dents but with how the general population, as typified by the average76 or
reasonable77 man, would have responded to this situation.
Some human-factors testimony goes further and becomes entirely conjec-
tural. In the Cole case, Dr. Scherer stated that looking into the sun would
have made it more difficult for plaintiff to judge the depth factor. That plain-
tiff dove in the direction of the sun, however, was not deduced from testimony
but from the expert's examination of a map of the region.78 Dr. Scherer was
also speculating when he concluded that plaintiff may have acted faster on the
day of the accident simply because it was a holiday.79 Furthermore, he failed
to establish the basis for his determination that a holiday causes reckless ac-
tions.80 Without further explanation or justification for his conclusion, Dr.
Scherer's statement does not appear to satisfy the assistance test.
Similarly, Professor Korobow's conclusion in Buchman that at the mini-
mum eighty percent of the population would not have been able to hear the
train whistle lacks a method of analysis that the jury could use to indepen-
dently evaluate the testimony.8' More important, however, is whether such a
conclusion is reliable. The voice print evidence in Williams showed a high
correlation between actual voices and test identifications. 82 Without a "de-
monstrable, objective procedure for reaching the opinion and qualified per-
sons who can either duplicate the result or criticize the means by which it was
reached,"83 testimony based on a scientific field should not be admitted. The
73. See State v. Galloway, 275 N.W.2d 736 (Iowa 1979); State v. Porraro, 404 A.2d 465 (R.I.
1979). But see People v. Hurley, 95 Cal. App. 3d 895, 157 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1979) (dissenting opin-
ion) (testimony related to misidentifications would be of assistance).
The Galloway case indicates a recurring problem with expert testimony, that of the profes-
sional witness. Defendant in this Iowa case offered Dr. Elizabeth Loftus as the expert, the same
witness whose testimony was rejected in the Florida Nelson decision. For proposals to improve
the practice of employing experts, see C. McCormick, supra note 34, § 17.
74. Public Health Foundation v. Cole, 352 So. 2d at 880.
75. See Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Hill, 250 So. 2d at 314.
76. Id. at 315; Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Kubalski, 323 So. 2d at 33.
77. 352 So. 2d at 879. See also Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Buchman, 358 So. 2d at 840
(expert opinion that a minimum of 80% of population would not have been able to hear whistle).
78. 352 So. 2d at 880. Dr. Scherer himself characterized as only a possibility his conclusion
that plaintiff was unable to see because of the direction she was facing. Id.
79. Id.
80. Scherer testified, "[lit is the Fourth of July. She is feeling happy. She is enjoying herself.
It is a holiday, and she just jumps so that the emotional tone was set for doing something like
this." Id.
81. 358 So. 2d at 840.
82. 583 F.2d at 1198-99.
83. United States v. Brady, 595 F.2d 359, 363 (6th Cir. 1979).
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unproven reliability of human-factors testimony leads one to the conclusion
that the jury has the ability to analyze the same variables and make determi-
nations just as valid as those of the experts.84
While the Florida courts committed a serious error by failing to establish
the reliability of human-factors testimony, they made a graver mistake by ac-
cepting testimony concerning the behavior of the reasonably prudent person.
Until recent years a general doctrine existed that no witness, expert or not,
could state opinions or conclusions about an ultimate issue of fact. Issues of
law, such as whether a person's action constituted negligence, were even fur-
ther removed from the province of witnesses than issues of fact.85 Following
the general trend of relaxing this doctrine, Federal Rule of Evidence 704 (rule
703 in Florida) formally removes the bar to testimony that includes an ulti-
mate issue of fact.8 6 All other requirements for admission must still be satis-
fied.87
Decisions by state supreme courts in Oregon and North Dakota are indic-
ative of conflicting approaches to the question of admitting testimony on legal
standards. In the Oregon case,88 which involved facts similar to those in the
Florida human-factors cases, the court held that an expert in railroad crossing
safety should not have been permitted to testify that the crossing was ex-
trahazardous. The Oregon test of this "extrahazardous" standard is whether a
reasonably prudent person can use a crossing safely. Despite the witness' ex-
perience in designing railroad crossings, the court ruled him incompetent to
aid the jury on this question because he possessed no special knowledge of the
characteristics of the reasonably prudent person.8 9 The court barred only the
conclusion about the standard of law, however, and allowed testimony on the
factors that increased the dangerousness of the crossing and the preventive
measures that could have been taken.
The North Dakota court,90 holding that a qualified expert could give an
opinion whether a crossing was extrahazardous, applied rule 702 and deter-
84. Psychological evidence may fail to provide accuracy greater than would occur by chance.
See Comment, supra note 58, at 599. Though advocating curtailment of psychologists testifying as
experts, the author of this Comment supports a continuation of the psychologist's role in interpret-
ing human behavior based on firsthand knowledge. Id. at 599 n.286.
85. See generally C. McCormick, supra note 34, § 12.
North Carolina retains the traditional "ultimate issue" rule. The form of the question may
determine admissibility of the opinion. Given a hypothetical question, an expert may state what
causes would lead to a particular result, yet an assertion that the result was actually produced by a
particular cause is inadmissible. Also inadmissible is expert testimony that is speculative or con-
jectural. Hubbard v. Quality Oil Co., 268 N.C. 489, 151 S.E.2d 71 (1966).
86. Fed. R. Evid. 704; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.703 (West 1979).
87. United States v. Scavo, 593 F.2d 837, 844 (8th Cir. 1979). See Fed. R. Evid. 704, Adv.
Comm. Note.
88. Koch v. Southern Pac. Co., 266 Or. 335, 513 P.2d 770 (1973).
89. Id. at 343-44, 513 P.2d at 774. The court noted that the expert was asked "not what a
reasonably prudent railroad crossing designer or builder would do, but whether a reasonably pru-
dent automobile driver could safely use the crossing. . . ," and held that this was "not the subject
of expert testimony." Id. at 347, 513 P.2d at 775. But see Harrell v. City of Belen, 93 N.M. 601,
603 P.2d 711 (1979) (clinical psychologist permitted to give opinion as to what would have been a
reasonable action for the police to.have taken to prevent decedent's suicide).
90. South v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 290 N.W.2d 819 (N.D. 1980).
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mined that an expert could offer assistance on a legal question. The expert
was a civil engineer who had researched highway traffic patterns as well as
driver behavior and reactions. Since he was intimately familiar with both de-
sign of roads and how drivers react to dangers, the expert could assist the jury
in determining whether the crossing was extrahazardous. 91
Compared to the North Dakota approach, the Oregon court's view-that
no expert could ever be qualified to voice an opinion concerning the behavior
of the reasonable person-is more consistent with the tradition of leaving the
determination of ultimate legal issues to the trier of fact. 92 The Federal Rules
of Evidence seem to be in accord with this reasoning, although there is no
specific exclusion of opinions on ultimate legal issues. Two justifications for
exclusion may be derived from the assistance requirement of rule 702. First,
no witness can be an expert on the behavior of the reasonably prudent person,
since the reasonable person is a mythical one, "not to be identified with any
ordinary individual. '93 Accordingly, an expert has no basis for his testimony
and cannot satisfy the assistance test. Second, opinions that only instruct the
trier of fact on which result to reach also fail to provide the requisite assist-
ance.
94
Of the four Florida human-factors cases discussed above, the Cole deci-
sion went the farthest in admitting improper legal standard testimony. Dr.
Scherer testified that a reasonably prudent person could have had plaintiff's
accident,95 thus effectively concluding that plaintiff was not negligent. Dr.
Scherer's qualifications to testify as an expert on perception difficulties, appear
to be questionable,96 and certainly do not indicate that he could be classified
as an expert on the reasonably prudent person standard. His testimony would
also be barred under the traditional approach, which reserves determination of
ultimate legal issues to the jury alone,
How the Federal Rules of Evidence will affect future decisions about ad-
mission of human-factors testimony in Florida and other jurisdictions is un-
clear. The standard for admission of expert testimony since adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, is whether proffered opinions will assist the trier of
fact. The former test was whether the subject matter of the opinion exceeds
the scope of knowledge of the average layperson. Although the Florida
Supreme Court in Buchman recognized the propriety of the current standard,
the court applied it only superficially. Since the jury had to consider questions
91. Id. at 831 (the court specified that its determination of admissibility was made with re-
spect to rule 702).
92. See C. McCormick, supra note 34, § 12.
93. W. Prosser, The Law of Torts, § 32, at 151 (4th ed. 1971).
94. Fed. R. Evid. 704, Adv. Comm. Note (opinions that tell the jury what result to reach do
not meet the rule 702 requirement of assisting the jury and also violate the rule 403 provision
against evidence that, although relevant, wastes time). See Stoler v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 583
F.2d 896 (6th Cir. 1978) (although noting that there has not been a conclusive determination
concerning admissibility of ultimate legal opinions, court held that exclusion of such an opinion
was not an abuse of discretion).
95. 352 So. 2d at 879-81.
96. See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra.
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of driver reaction time and whistle audibility, subjects on which two human-
factors specialists had testified at trial, the court held that the assistance re-
quirement was satisfied. 97 By failing to determine whether human-factors tes-
timony met the level of reliability necessary to qualify as scientifically based,
the supreme court created the substantial possibility that the foundation of the
jury's negligence determination consisted of invalid expert conclusions.
Similarly, prejudice98 arises when a witness testifies on a subject outside
his area of expertise, as in Hill. And if a witness is not an expert on the spe-
cific topic that he addresses, his opinions cannot assist the jury. Finally, con-
clusions about the behavior of the reasonably prudent person only declare
what result the jury should reach rather than provide any assistance. Such
testimony should always be rejected as being "an unwarranted incursion into
the sphere of influence belonging solely to the jury."99
To counter the danger of prejudice, the Florida Evidence Code provides
for significant attorney input into the decision to admit expert testimony. Rule
705 stipulates that a party opposing admission of an expert opinion may con-
duct a voir dire examination of the proposed witness before trial. If prima
facie evidence that the witness lacks sufficient basis for his opinion is estab-
lished, the court will bar the testimony, subject to subsequent proof of the
basis. 100 Federal rule 705 allows cross-examination of the expert at trial con-
cerning his basis but does not specifically provide for pretrial probing.101
Thus, an alert attorney in Florida may prevent testimony before the jury by an
expert who is not sufficiently qualified or whose field is not scientifically relia-
ble. This system is more effective than allowing an expert to testify and then
relying on cross-examination to correct misconceptions in the minds of the
jurors.
It remains the ultimate responsibility of the courts themselves, however,
to bar opinions on legal standards. If the jury is to have a more meaningful
role in the trial process than that of a conduit for experts' determinations, con-
clusions on whether particular conduct satisfies the applicable legal standard
should remain solely with the jury. Human-factors testimony should be chal-
lenged by opposing counsel and excluded by the court unless it is demon-
strated that the evidence has scientific reliability. Otherwise, there is a
97. 381 So. 2d at 230.
98. If the prejudicial impact of expert opinion evidence substantially outweighs its probative
value, such evidence may be excluded by the trial court. United States v. Milton, 555 F.2d 1198
(5th Cir. 1977).
The Florida courts that rejected human factors testimony were concerned with the prejudicial
impact that improper expert testimony could have on a jury. That the jury might have reached
the same verdict based on evidence independent from the expert opinions did not justify deeming
the expert opinions harmless error. Kubalski, 323 So. 2d at 34. Moreover, unnecessary expert
testimony can have the effect of unduly influencing the jury's determination of negligqnce. Buch-
man, 358 So. 2d at 842.
99. 352 So. 2d at 880 (Downey, J., concurring).
100. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.705(2) (West 1979).
101. Fed. R. Evid. 705.
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significant danger that the functions of the jury will be usurped by the human-
factors "expert."
ROBERT LYMAN DEWEY
Constitutional Law-United States v. DiFrancesco: "Continuing
Jeopardy"--An Old Concept Gains New Life
In Ke.pner v. United States' Justice Holmes stated in regard to the double
jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment:2 "[Llogically and rationally a man
cannot be said to be more than once in jeopardy in the same cause, however
often he may be tried. The jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy from its be-
ginning to the end of the cause."' 3 While the United States Supreme Court
repeatedly has rejected Holmes' concept4 of "continuing jeopardy, '5 a recent
decision has given it new life. In a case of first impression,6 the Court in
United States v. DiFrancesco7 considered the constitutionality of a statute that
allows the government to appeal a sentence as too lenient.8 In affirming the
1. 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
2. "No person shall.. . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb .... " U.S. Const. amend. V.
3. 195 U.S. at 134 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
4. The phrase "continuing jeopardy" has been said to describe "both a concept and a con-
clusion." Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 534 (1975). The concept denotes the notion advanced by
Justice Holmes: once jeopardy attaches in a particular action a defendant remains in jeopardy
throughout the proceedings related to that action. 195 U.S. at 134. However, the conclusion "has
occasionally been used to explain why an accused who has secured the reversal of his conviction
on appeal may be retried for the same offense." 421 U.S. at 534. See, e.g., Price v. Georgia, 398
U.S. 323, 326-29 & n.3 (1970); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 189 (1957).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 90 & n.6 (1978); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S.
519, 534 (1975); United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 369 (1975); Green v. United States, 355
U.S. 184, 193, 197 (1957).
6. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980), was the first case in which the govern-
ment appealed a sentence imposed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1976). For a discussion of
§ 3575, see note 12 infra. In several other cases, the government has appealed because of the trial
court's refusal to sentence a defendant under § 3575. See, e.g., United States v. Ilacqua, 562 F.2d
399 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Bailey, 537 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Stewart, 531 F.2d 326 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 922 (1976); United States v. Kelly, 519 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1975).
7. 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1976). This statute provides:
With respect to the imposition, correction, or reduction of a sentence after proceed-
ings under section 3575 of this chapter, a review of the sentence on the record of the
sentencing court may be taken by the defendant or the United States to a court of ap-
peals. Any review of the sentence taken by the United States shall be taken at least five
days before expiration of the time for taking a review of the sentence or appeal of the
conviction by the defendant and shall be diligently prosecuted. The sentencing court
may, with or without motion and notice, extend the time for taking a review of the
sentence for a period not to exceed thirty days from the expiration of the time otherwise
prescribed by law. The court shall not extend the time for taking a review of the sen-
tence by the United States after the time has expired. A court extending the time for
taking a review of the sentence by the United States shall extend the time for taking a
review of the sentence or appeal of the conviction by the defendant for the same period.
The taking of a review of sentence by the United States shall be deemed the taking of a
review of the sentence and an appeal of the conviction by the defendant. Review of the
sentence shall include review of whether the procedure employed was lawful, the find-
ings made were clearly erroneous, or the sentencing court's discretion was abused. The
court of appeals on review of the sentence may, after considering the record, including
the entire presentence report, information submitted during the trial of such felony and
the sentencing heari., and the findings and reasons of the sentencing court, affirm the
sentence, impose or direct the imposition of any sentence which the sentencing court
could originally have imposed, or remand for further sentencing proceedings and impo-
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constitutionality of this statute, the Court held that section 3576 of the Crimi-
nal Code9 did not violate either the guarantee against multiple trials or the
guarantee against multiple punishment, both inherent in the double jeopardy
clause.10
Eugene DiFrancesco was convicted of racketeering and bombing in two
separate jury trials in the United States District Court for the Western District
of New York." Subsequently, the court conducted a special sentencing hear-
ing at which it ruled that DiFrancesco was a "dangerous special offender,"' 2
sitions of sentence, except that a sentence may be made more severe only on review of
the sentence taken by the United States and after hearing. Failure of the United States
to take a review of the imposition of the sentence shall, upon review taken by the United
States of the correction or reduction of the sentence, foreclose imposition of a sentence
more severe than that previously imposed. Any withdrawal or dismissal of a sentence
taken by the United States shall foreclose imposition of a sentence more severe that that
reviewed but shall not otherwise foreclose the review of the sentence or the appeal of the
conviction. The court of appeals shall state in writing the reasons for its disposition of
the review of the sentence. Any review of the sentence taken by the United States may
be dismissed on a showing of abuse of the right of the United States to take such review.
9. Section 3576 is part of the Dangerous Offender Sentencing Statutes of Title X of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1001(a), 84 Stat. 950 (1970) (codified
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575-78 (1976)).
10. 449 U.S. at 126-43. In so holding, the Court to some extent settled what has become a
favorite controversy among academic and professional commentators. For conclusions that
prosecutorial appeals of sentences are constitutional, see Dunsky, The Constitutionality of In-
creasing Sentences on Appellate Review, 69 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 19 (1978); Stern, Govern-
ment Appeals of Criminal Sentences: A Constitutional Response to Arbitrary and Unreasonable
Sentences, 18 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 51 (1980); Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflec-
tions on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 1001 (1980); Note, Double
Jeopardy Limits on Prosecutorial Appeal of Sentences, 1980 Duke L. J. 847; Recent Development,
Government Appeal of Dangerous Special Offender Sentence Violates Double Jeopardy Clause,
65 Cornell L. Rev. 715 (1980).
For conclusions that such appeals are unconstitutional, see ABA Ad Hoc Committee on Fed-
eral Criminal Code, Report on Government Appeal of Sentences, 35 Bus. Law. 617 (1980); Free-
man & Earley, United States v. DiFrancesco: Government Appeal of Sentences, 18 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 91 (1980); Spence, The Federal Criminal Code Reform Act of 1977 and Prosecutorial Appeal
of Sentences: Justice or Double Jeopardy?, 37 Md. L. Rev. 739 (1978); Note, Twice in Jeopardy:
Prosecutorial Appeals of Sentences, 63 Va. L. Rev. 325 (1977).
See also Note, The Constitutionality of Statutes Permitting Increased Sentences for Habitual
or Dangerous Criminals, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 356 (1975) (question unclear).
11. United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769, 772-73 (2d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 117
(1980). DiFrancesco was indicted first on the bombing charges (18 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 371, 8420)
(1976)), but was tried first on the racketeering indictment (18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), (d) (1976)). 604
F.2d at 772-73.
12. 604 F.2d at 779-80. Prior to the trial on the racketeering charges, the government filed
notice pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3575(a) (1976), alleging that DiFrancesco was a "dangerous special
offender" as defined in sections 3575(e)(3) and (f). 604 F.2d at 779. Such notice indicates the
government's intention to seek, upon defendant's conviction, imposition of an enhanced sentence
under section 3575(b). Section 3575(b) requires the district court to hold a special sentencing
hearing to determine whether the defendant is a "dangerous special offender." This statute pro-
vides in pertinent part:
Upon any plea of guilty or nolo contendere or verdict or finding of guilty of the
defendant of such felony, a hearing shall be held, before sentence is imposed, by the
court sitting without a jury. . . . If it appears by a preponderance of the information,
including information submitted during the trial of such felony and the sentencing hear-
ing and so much of the presentence report as the court relies upon, that the defendant is a
dangerous special offender, the court shall sentence the defendant to imprisonment for
an appropriate term not to exceed twenty-five years and not disproportionate m severityto the maximum term otherwis  authorized b  law for such felony. Otherwise it shall
sentence the defendant in accordance with the law prescribing penalties for such felony.
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and sentenced him to concurrent ten-year prison terms on the racketeering
charges, to be served concurrently with the nine-year sentence imposed previ-
ously on the bombing charges.13 Dissatisfied with this sentence, the govern-
ment appealed pursuant to section 3576.14 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, rejecting the government's request for an en-
hanced sentence on the ground that section 3576 violated the double jeopardy
clause, 15 affirmed both the sentences and the convictions. 16
In reversing the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court analyzed three basic
issues. First, noting that the double jeopardy focus fell on the sentence rather
than on the appeal,1 7 the Court considered whether a criminal sentence should
be accorded the degree of finality that attaches to a verdict of acquittal.18 Cit-
ing early English common law, 19 North Carolina v. Pearce,20 and the policy
behind the double jeopardy bar to reprosecution after an acquittal,2 1 the Court
concluded that "neither the history of sentencing practices, nor the pertinent
rulings of this Court, nor even considerations of double jeopardy policy sup-
The court shall place in the record its findings, including an identification of the infor-
mation relied upon in making such findings, and its reasons for the sentence imposed.
18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1976).
13. 604 F.2d at 780.
14. Id. The government based its appeal on the ground that the trial court abused its discre-
tion: despite its findings that defendant was a "dangerous special offender," the trial court im-
posed sentences that amounted to additional imprisonment for defendant of only one year. See
notes 8, 12 and accompanying text supra. DiFrancesco appealed from both convictions, but did
not seek review of the sentences. 449 U.S. at 123.
15. 604 F.2d at 783. The Second Circuit's holding was based principally on Kepner v.
United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904), and United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931). 604 F.2d at
783-85. For a discussion of Kepner and Benz, see text accompanying notes 35-38 & 59-63 infra.
The court distinguished North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), on the ground that the
defendant in Pearce had voluntarily subjected himself to the risk of an increased sentence. 604
F.2d at 786; see text accompanying notes 53-57 infra. By holding that section 3576 was unconsti-
tutional, the Second Circuit lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the government's appeal,
and therefore dismissed it. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339 (1975).
In a concurring opinion, District Judge Haight (sitting by designation from the Southern
District of New York) argued that the government's appeal should have been dismissed because
18 U.S.C. §§ 3575-76 did not apply to the defendant. He reasoned that DiFrancesco could have
been sentenced to two consecutive 20-year terms without imposition of the "dangerous special
offender" sentence, and therefore did not qualify under section 3575(f) for the special sentence.
604 F.2d at 787-89 (Haight, J., concurring). He added, however, that in the event his interpreta-
tion proved incorrect, he would support the majority's constitutional analysis. Id. at 789 n.7.
16. Id. at 773-79.
17. 449 U.S. at 132-35.
18. Id. at 132-33.
19. Id. at 133-34. The Court observed that at early English common law, the trial court
practice of increasing a sentence during the same term of court was not thought to violate doublejeopardy principles. For several brief summaries of the United States Constitution's assimilation
of early English common law principles of double jeopardy, see United States v. Scott, 437 U.S.
82, 87 (1978); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339-40 (1975); Green v. United States, 355
U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957); id. at 200 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
20. 395 U.S. 711 (1969). See text accompanying notes 52-55 infra.
21. "We have noted above the basic design of the double jeopardy provision, that is, as a bar
against repeated attempts to convict, with consequent subjection of the defendant to embarrass-
ment, expense, anxiety, and insecurity, and the possibility that he may be found guilty even
though innocent." 449 U.S. at 136 (paraphrasing Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88
(1957)). The Court stated that a government appeal of a sentence did not subject a defendant to
this ordeal, because the appeal must be taken promptly and because the appeal is essentially a
nonadversarial judicial review of the record of the sentencing court. 449 U.S. at 136-37.
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port" the proposition that a sentence carries the same degree of finality as an
acquittal.22 The Court then considered whether an increase in a sentence pur-
suant to section 3576 constituted multiple punishment. In concluding that it
did not, the Court stated that the Second Circuit's reliance on dictum in United
States v. Benz 23 was unfounded, because the dictum's source, Ex parte
Lange,24 stood only for the proposition that a defendant may not be sentenced
beyond what is legislatively authorized.25 Finally, the Court compared the
sentence review procedure provided in section 3576 with the two-stage crimi-
nal proceeding held constitutional in Swisher v. Brady.26 Noting that the pro-
cedure under section 3576 is more limited in scope than the procedure in
Swisher, the Court concluded that "the limited appellate review of a sentence
authorized by section 3576 is necessarily constitutional. '27
In a vigorous dissent,28 Justice Brennan argued that sentencing and ac-
quittal procedures are sufficiently similar so that no meaningful distinction
may be drawn between the two for double jeopardy purposes.29 He also criti-
cized the majority's refusal to follow established dicta in Lange, Benz, and
Reid v. Covert,30 which stated that an increase in sentence severity subsequent
to its imposition constituted multiple punishment.31 He characterized the
Court's comparison of the procedure provided in section 3576 with that up-
held in Swisher v. Brady as being "similarly misplaced."'3 2
Although the Supreme Court's application of the double jeopardy clause
has been infamously amorphous,33 a brief survey of prior decisions is a pre-
22. 449 U.S. at 132. Accordingly, a government appeal of a sentence did not constitute a
second prosecution in violation of the double jeopardy clause. Id. at 139.
23. 282 U.S. 304 (1931). See text accompanying notes 59-63 infra.
24. 85 U.S (18 Wall.) 163 (1874). See text accompanying notes 56-58 infra.
25. 449 U.S. at 138-39.
26. 438 U.S. 204 (1978). See text accompanying notes 67-69 infra.
27. 449 U.S. at 141. The Court interpreted section 3576 "as establishing at the most a two-
stage criminal proceeding." Id. at 439 n.16.
28. Id. at 143-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting; White, Marshall, Stevens, JJ., joining). In addition
to joining Justice Brennan's dissent, Justice Stevens filed a separate dissenting opinion that merely
echoed Justice Harlan's dissent in Pearce. See note 54 infra.
29. "The sentencing of a convicted criminal is sufficiently analogous to a determination of
guilt or innocence that the Double Jeopardy Clause should preclude government appeals from
sentencing decisions very much as it prevents appeals from judgments of acquittal." Id. at 146. In
Bullington v. Missouri, 101 S. Ct. 1852 (1981), the Court adopted this position with respect to the
sentencing procedure employed by the State of Missouri. See discussion at note 70 infra.
30. 354 U.S. 1, 37 n.68 (1957) (plurality opinion) ("In Swain v. United States, 165 U.S. 553,
this Court held that the President or commanding officer had power to return a case to a court-
martial for an increase in sentence. If the double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment
were applicable such a practice would be unconstitutional."). Reid was subsequently adopted as
the controlling opinion of the Court in Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234,
237 (1960); Grisham v. Hogan, 361 U.S. 278, 280 (1960); and McElroy v. United States cx rel.
Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 284 (1960).
31. 449 U.S. at 144-45. This criticism approved the position taken by the Second Circuit.
See note 15 supra.
32. 449 U.S. at 151.
33. "[V]irtually all of the [double jeopardy] cases turn on the particular facts and thus escape
meaningful categorization. . . ." Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 464 (1973). "[The riddle of
double jeopardy stands out today as one of the most commonly recognized yet most commonly
misunderstood maxims in the law, the passage of time having served in the main to burden it with
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requisite to understanding the Court's tripartite analysis in DiFrancesco. Be-
ginning with United States v. Ball,34 the Supreme Court established that the
double jeopardy clause is an absolute bar to a second trial following an acquit-
tal. In Kepner v. United States35 the Court applied this rule to a government
appeal.36 In that case, the defendant was acquitted at his original trial, but the
government appealed pursuant to traditional Philippine procedure that pro-
vided for a trial de novo in the Philippine Supreme Court. Applying the Ball
principle, the United States Supreme Court rejected Justice Holmes' "continu-
ing jeopardy" theory37 and held that the procedure in the appellate court was
a second trial on the merits.38 The Court subsequently has applied the Ball
principle to bar retrials following an acquittal even when "the acquittal was
based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation." 39
In Green v. United States40 the Court extended this rule to cases of "im-
plied acquittals." In Green, the defendant was convicted of first-degree mur-
der after an appellate court had reversed his prior conviction on the lesser
included offense of second-degree murder. Rejecting an argument based on
Trono v. United States4 l that the defendant had "waived" his double jeopardy
claim by appealing his first conviction, the Court reversed the second convic-
tion on the ground that the prior verdict of guilty on the second-degree murder
confusion upon confusion." Note, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 522, 522 (1940), quoted in Westen & Drubel,
Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 Sup. Ct. Rev. 81, 82. This Note does not
attempt to examine the vast and integrated history of the double jeopardy clause. For a brief but
in-depth survey of such history, see J. Sigler, Double Jeopardy 1-37 (1969).
34. 163 U.S. 662 (1896). In Ball, three defendants were tried upon a technically defective
murder indictment: one was acquitted and two were convicted. Subsequent to the Supreme
Court's reversal of the convictions in Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118 (1891), all three defend-
ants were retried and convicted. On second appeal, the Court held that the double jeopardy
clause prohibited reprosecution of the formerly acquitted defendant but did not prohibit rep-
rosecution of the defendants formerly convicted. The Court reasoned that the double jeopardy
clause prohibited retrial of a defendant following a favorable ruling by the finder of fact. 163 U.S.
at 671.
35. 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
36. Prior to 1970 the government's authority to appeal was severely limited. In United States
v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310 (1892), the Supreme Court held that the government could not appeal a
criminal decision absent explicit legislative authorization. Id. at 318, 322-23. This authorization
was first granted by the Criminal Appeals Act of 1907, ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246 (1907), which
empowered the government to appeal from a decision dismissing an indictment or arresting a
judgment when such decision was based upon the construction or invalidation of a statute. After
several amendments, Congress repealed the 1907 Act in 1970 and replaced it with its current
version: the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-644, 84 Stat. 1890 (1971) (codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976)). For a thorough account of the evolution of the Omnibus Act, see
United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 291-96 (1970).
37. See notes 3-5 and accompanying text supra.
38. 195 U.S. at 133.
39. Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (per curiam); Arizona v. Washing-
ton, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978) (quoting Fong Foo) (dictum). But cf. United States v. Wilson, 420
U.S. 332, 344-45 (1976) (government appeals following acquittals are prohibited only when there
is the possibility of reprosecution for the same offense).
40. 335 U.S. 184 (1957).
41. 199 U.S. 521 (1905). See text accompanying notes 45-47 infra. With respect to the waiver
doctrine of Trono, the Green Court stated: "Conditioning an appeal of one offense on a coerced
surrender of a valid plea of former jeopardy on another offense exacts a forfeiture in plain conflict
with the constitutional bar against double jeopardy." 355 U.S. at 193-94 (footnote omitted).
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charge operated as an "implicit acquittal" of the first-degree murder charge.42
The Court reasoned that with respect to the first-degree murder charge, jeop-
ardy attached in the first trial when the jury "was given a full opportunity to
return a verdict" on that charge.43
The Court has refused to extend the absolute rule applied to acquittals of
substantive offenses to the sentencing area. The Court has at various times
advanced several different theories to explain the permissibility of increasing a
sentence following an appeal of a conviction.44 The oldest of these theories
was enunciated in Trono v. United States.4s There the defendants were acquit-
ted of murder but convicted of assault. On defendants' appeal, the Philippine
Supreme Court reversed the assault conviction but convicted the defendants of
murder.46 The United States Supreme Court upheld the murder conviction,
stating that the defendants had "waived" their right to invoke the plea of for-
mer jeopardy on the murder charge by appealing their assault convictions.47
42. 355 U.S. at 190.
43. Id. at 191.
44. Aside from the waiver doctrine of Trono, the Court has employed two other theories.
One is the balancing theory espoused by Justice Harlan in United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463
(1964):
Corresponding to the right of an accused to be given a fair trial is the societal interest in
punishing one whose guilt is clear after he has obtained such a trial. It would be a high
price indeed for society to pay were every accused granted immunity from punishment
because of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the proceedings leading
to conviction. From the standpoint of a defendant, it is at least doubtful that appellate
courts would be as zealous as they now are in protecting against the effects of improprie-
ties at the trial or pretrial stage if they knew that reversal of a conviction would put the
accused irrevocably beyond the reach of further prosecution. In reality, therefore, the
practice of retrial serves defendants' rights as well as society's interests.
Id. at 466. Although this theory easily explains reprosecution following a conviction, it does not
easily explain an increase in sentence following reconviction. To strike the balance in favor of the
state, a court would have to find that the defendant did not preserve his interest in avoiding the
anxiety of resentencing, and his interest in having the same tribunal that tried the case fix the
sentence. Clearly, the balance swings against the defendant, provided that he forfeits his interests
by appealing his conviction; however, this result simply restates the "waiver" theory.
The third theory is the continuing jeopardy "conclusion" most recently employed in Price v.
Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 326-27 & n.3 (1970). Although the Price opinion referred to the theory as a
"concept," id. at 326, the Court later sought to distinguish Holmes' notion of continuing jeopardy
from Price's by denoting Holmes' as a "concept" and Price's as a "conclusion." Breed v. Jones,
421 U.S. 519, 534 (1975). See note 4 supra. Despite this unnecessary confusion, the two notions
are readily distinguishable. Holmes' concept means simply that for any one crime there can attach
only one jeopardy regardless of how often a defendant may be tried for that crime. For example,
if a defendant's sentence for a certain crime is increased, he is not subjected to a second jeopardy
because he is being punished only for the one crime he committed. Thus, the jeopardy does not
terminate until the state has exhausted its power to pursue the defendant. Price's conclusion is just
that: a conclusory orpost hoc characterization of a certain event that facilitates an understanding
of the rationale upon which the event is based. Price permitted reprosecution of a defendant
whose conviction was reversed because of an erroneous jury instruction. In this context, "continu-
ing jeopardy" was merely a shorthand expression used to convey the Court's belief that a defend-
ant once adjudged guilty should not be set free upon a procedural technicality which may or may
not be related to the original verdict.
45. 199 U.S. 521 (1905).
46. As in Kepner, the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands was empowered to determine
the guilt or innocence of the defendants and to impose sentences upon appeal. Id. at 533-34.
47. Id. at 533. With respect to a defendant's appeal from the judgment of a trial court, the
Court stated:
As the judgment stands before he appeals, it is a complete bar to any further prosecu-
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This waiver doctrine was extended in Flemister v. United States,48 Ocampo v.
United States,4 9 and Stroud v. United States50 to allow sentence increases fol-
lowing conviction upon retrial.
Although Green is cited for substantially vitiating Trono and its prog-
eny,5' the underlying substantive import of these decisions was reaffirmed em-
phatically in North Carolina v. Pearce.52 There the defendant was sentenced
to prison after his conviction for assault with intent to commit rape. Upon
securing the reversal of his conviction, the defendant was again convicted and
was sentenced to a prison term greater than the original. In holding that the
double jeopardy clause did not bar an increase in sentence following a retrial
for the same offense 53, the Court rejected the argument that the defendant's
initial sentence should be treated as an "implied acquittal" of any greater sen-
tence, distinguishing Green as "based upon the double jeopardy provision's
guarantee against retrial for an offense of which the defendant was acquit-
ted."54 In what smacks of a subtle resurrection of the waiver doctrine, the
tion for the offense set forth in the indictment, or of any lesser degree thereof. No power
can wrest from him the right to so use that judgment, but if he chooses to appeal from it
and to ask for its reversal he thereby waives, if successful, his right to avail himself of the
former acquittal of the greater offense, contained in the judgment which he has himself
procured to be reversed.
Id.
48. 207 U.S. 372 (1907). In Flemister, the defendant was convicted in the court of first in-
stance of resisting arrest. On defendant's appeal, the Philippine Supreme Court decided that the
offense fell within a different statute, and increased the sentence. The United States Supreme
Court upheld the increase. Id. at 374.
49. 234 U.S. 91 (1914). The facts in Ocampo were very similar to those in Flemister. The
Court relied on Kepner and Femister in again upholding an increase in sentence by the Philippine
Supreme Court. Id. at 102.
50. 251 U.S. 15 (1919). The defendant in Stroud, popularly known as the "Birdman of Alca-
traz," was tried and convicted three times on the same first degree murder charge. Imposed re-
spectively were sentences of death, life imprisonment, and death. Relying on Trono, the Court
held that the sentence of life imprisonment following the second trial did not prohibit imposition
of the death penalty following the third trial. Id. at 17-18. The Court observed that "the plaintiff
in error himself evoked the action of the court which resulted in a further trial. In such cases he is
not placed in second jeopardy within the meaning of the Constitution." Id. at 18.
51. See, e.g., Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978) (citing Green) ("It cannot be mean-
ingfully said that a person 'waives' his right to a judgment of acquittal by moving for a new
trial."). But see note 55 & accompanying text infra.
52. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
53. Id. at 719-23.
54. Id. at 720 n.16 (emphasis in original). See also Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 25
(1973) ("The possibility of a higher sentence was recognized and accepted [in Pearce] as a legiti-
mate concomitant of the retrial process."). In response to the Pearce majority's distinction of
Green, Justice Harlan wrote:
Every consideration enunciated by the Court in support of the decision in Green
applies with equal force to the situation at bar. In each instance, the defendant was once
subjected to the risk of receiving a maximum punishment, but it was determined by legal
process that he should receive only a specified punishment less than the maximum....
And the concept or fiction of an "implicit acquittal" of the greater offense ... applies
equally to the greater sentence: in each case it was determined at the former trial that the
defendant or his offense was of a certain limited degree of 'badness' or gravity only, and
therefore merited only a certain limited punishment ....
If, as a matter of policy and practicality, the imposition of an increased sentence on
retrial has the same consequences whether effected in the guise of an increase in the
degree or an augmentation of punishment, what other factors render one route forbidden
and the other permissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause? It cannot be that the
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Court argued that the "rationale" for allowing the government to retry a de-
fendant after a reversed conviction "rests ultimately upon the premise that the
original conviction has, at the defendant's behest, been wholly nullified and the
slate wiped clean." 55
In the multiple punishment area, the Supreme Court in Exparte Lange56
established that a trial court may not impose an additional sentence subse-
quent to one legally imposed and fully executed. In Lange, the defendant was
convicted of stealing mail bags, a crime punishable by imprisonment for not
more that one year or a fine of not less than $10 nor more than $200. None-
theless, the defendant was sentenced to one year's imprisonment and fined
$200. Noting that the defendant had paid the fine, the Court granted defend-
ant's writ of habeas corpus, holding that "when the prisoner, as in this case,
had fully suffered one of the alternative punishments for which alone the law
subjected him, the power of the court to punish further was gone." 57 More
importantly, the Court observed in dictum that "after judgment has been ren-
dered on the conviction, and the sentence of that judgment executed on the
criminal, he [cannot] be again sentenced on that conviction to another...
punishment. 58
In United States v. Benz,59 the Court again addressed the issue of a trial
court's sentencing authority. There the defendant pleaded guilty to a charge
of violating the National Prohibition Act and was sentenced to a ten-month
prison term. While serving this sentence, and before expiration of the term of
the federal district court which had imposed the sentence, the defendant peti-
tioned the court for a modification of his punishment. Over the government's
objection, the court reduced the term of imprisonment to six months. On ap-
peal by the government, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether a federal court had the
power to reduce a term of imprisonment under such circumstances. 60 Holding
that such reduction was permissible,61 the Court, citing Lange,62 added in dic-
provision does not comprehend "sentences"-as distinguished from "offenses"-for it
has long been established that once a prisoner commences service of sentence, the Clause
prevents a court from vacating the sentence and then imposing a greater one.
395 U.S. at 746-47 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 720-21 (emphasis added). At least one commentator recognized the possible effect
of Trono and its progeny post-Green. Low, Special Offender Sentencing, 8 Am. Crim. L.Q. 70, 86-
87 (1970) ("It seems clear to me that if Stroud, Ocampo, and F/emis/er are correct, then it should
be constitutional for the government to seek an increase in the sentence on appeal.").
56. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1874).
57. Id. at 176.
58. Id. at 173.
59. 282 U.S. 304 (1931).
60. Id. at 306. The question certified to the Court was:
After a District Court of the United States has imposed a sentence of imprisonment
upon a defendant in a criminal case, and after he has served a part of the sentence, has
that court, during the term in which it was imposed, power to amend the sentence by
shortening the term of imprisonment?
61. Id. at 306-07, 311.
62. Although the Court cited Lange extensively, it did not attempt to rationalize the distin-
guishing fact that Lange dealt only with the prohibition against imposing punishment beyond that
which was statutorily authorized.
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turn "that to increase the penalty is to subject the defendant to double punish-
ment for the same offense in violation of the Fifth Amendment .... 63
Sixteen years later, however, the Benz dictum was qualified in Bozza v.
United States.64 The defendant in Bozza was convicted of violating several
Internal Revenue provisions that mandated both a fine and imprisonment, but
was sentenced to imprisonment only. Upon discovering his error, the trial
judge several hours later returned the defendant to court and added the
mandatory fine. Relying on Benz, the defendant urged that the increased pun-
ishment placed him twice in jeopardy. The Court rejected this argument on
the ground that the pronouncement of final sentence does not preclude correc-
tion when that sentence is invalid.65 Accordingly, the court held that substitu-
tion of a valid sentence for an invalid one, despite its increased severity, "did
not twice place the [defendant] in jeopardy for the same offense." 66
In the recent case of Swisher v. Brady,6 7 the Court again had occasion to
examine the double jeopardy clause. In that case, the Court considered a chal-
lenge to a procedure employed by the Maryland juvenile criminal system.
Under that procedure, a master submitted a record of findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law and recommendations to the juvenile court judge who could
adopt, modify or reject it. This record was then subject to review at the elec-
tion of the juvenile defendant, the State or the judge sua sponte, except that
when the State filed exceptions and sought review of the judge's decision, the
review was limited solely to the record developed by the master.68 In rejecting
the argument that the Maryland procedure required a juvenile defendant to
stand trial a second time in violation of the double jeopardy clause, the Court
stated that "an accused juvenile is subjected to a single proceeding which be-
gins with a master's hearing and culminates with an adjudication by a
judge."69
Faced with these variegated and tangentially related prior cases, the
Supreme Court decided United States v. DiFrancesco. Although yet to express
63. 282 U.S. at 307. Similar dicta have been expressed in other Supreme Court and lower
court cases. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 37 n.68 (1957); United States v. Bynoe, 562 F.2d
126 (Ist Cir. 1977); Virgin Islands v. Henry, 533 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Turner,
518 F.2d 14 (7th Cir. 1975); Barnes v. United States, 419 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States
v. Sacco, 367 F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Adams, 362 F.2d 210 (6th Cir. 1966);
United States v. Walker, 346 F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1965); United States v. Chiarella, 214 F.2d 838 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 902 (1954); Oxman v. United States, 148 F.2d 750 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945); Frankel v. United States, 131 F.2d 756 (6th Cir. 1942); Rowley v.
Welch, 114 F.2d 499, 501 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1940). But cf. Vincent v. United States, 337 F.2d 891 (8th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 988 (1965) (sentence could be increased where defendant has not
commenced service). See also Robinson v. Warden, 455 F.2d 1172, 1176 (4th Cir. 1974) (uphold-
ing increase) ("We find no suggestion that by dictum the Benz Court intended to broaden Exparte
Lange'r interpretation of the double jeopardy clause.").
64. 330 U.S. 160 (1947).
65. Id. at 166.
66. Id. at 167.
67. 438 U.S. 204 (1978).
68. Id. at 210-11 & n.9 (describing and quoting Md. R.P. 911).
69. 438 U.S. at 215.
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a satisfactory rationale, 70 the Court's prior decisions have evidenced different
treatment of acquittals and sentencing. In United States v. Ball and Kepner v.
United States, the Court established that the double jeopardy clause is an ab-
solute bar to a second trial following an acquittal.71 This rule was extended in
Green v. United States to preclude retrial of a defendant for a greater offense
following a reversal of his conviction on a lesser included charge.72 In North
Carolina v. Pearce, however, the Court refused to extend Green's rationale to
sentencing.73 Based arguably on the waiver doctrine of Trono v. United
States,74 Pearce effectively demonstrated that a sentence does not carry the
finality of an acquittal.
The DiFrancesco Court's reliance on Pearce nonetheless may be criticized
in at least two respects. First, the DiFrancesco Court's interpretation of
Pearce's dictate regarding the finality of sentences is illogical. The Court rea-
soned that "[i]f any rule of finality had applied to the pronouncement of a
sentence, the original sentence in Pearce would have served as a ceiling on the
one imposed at retrial."75 The Court then added that any difference between
the imposition of a new sentence after retrial and one imposed following an
appeal "is no more than a 'conceptual nicety.' "76 However, this "conceptual
nicety"-retrial before resentencing-is the very mechanism that removed the
sentence ceiling in Pearce: "[W]e deal here, not with increases in existing
sentences, but with the imposition of wholly new sentences after wholly new
trials."' 77 Second, the waiver doctrine asserted in Pearce does not fit
DiFrancesco. In Pearce, the defendant initiated the appeal; in DiFrancesco,
70. The DiFrancesco Court did note Professor Westen's explanation of the underlying basis
for the Court's distinction between judgments of acquittal and verdicts of conviction: the jury's
prerogative to acquit against the evidence. 449 U.S. at 130 n. 11. See Westen, The Three Faces of
Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 Mich. L. Rev.
1001, 1064-65 (1980). The cogency of this rationale can be seen in Bullington v. Missouri, 101 S.
Ct. 1852 (1981), a decision handed down several months after DiFrancesco. There the defendant
initially was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, and subse-
quently reconvicted and sentenced to death. Under Missouri procedure, once a defendant is con-
victed of first-degree murder, the prosecutor in a separate proceeding before the same jury must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's crime warrants imposition of the death
penalty. The Court held that because under Missouri law the sentencing proceeding at the de-
fendant's first trial was almost identical to the trial on the question of innocence or guilt, the death
penalty could not be imposed upon retrial. Id. at 1862. The Court distinguished Pearce, on the
ground that "there was no separate sentencing proceeding at which the prosecution was required
to prove-beyond a reasonable doubt or otherwise-additional facts in order to justify the partic-
ular sentence." Id. at 1858.
As Professor Westen points out, however, this rationale cannot explain the Court's willing-
ness to attribute the same degree of sanctity to bench trial acquittals as it does to jury acquittals.
He suggests that the Court could eliminate a great deal of the confusion plaguing the doublejeopardy decisions by recognizing why acquittals should be accorded such a high de ree of final-
ity-because the jury should be the final arbiters of the defendant's innocence or guilt. This rec-
ognition would of course entail a redefining of the word "acquittal." See Westen, supra, at 1064-
65.
71. See text accompanying notes 34-39 supra.
72. See text accompanying notes 40-43 supra.
73. See text accompanying notes 52-55 supra.
74. See text accompanying notes 45-47 supra.
75. 449 U.S. at 135 (footnote omitted).
76. Id. at 136.
77. 395 U.S. at 722.
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the government appealed over the objection of the defendant. 78
Similarly, the Court's analysis of the multiple punishment issue is also
subject to criticism. In concluding that an increase in sentence on appellate
review does not constitute multiple punishment, the Court stated that a de-
fendant has no expectation of finality in an original sentence that Congress
specifically subjected to review.79 Manifestly, this syllogism merely begs the
constitutional question of the validity of such a provision.
Though the Court's characterizations of the holdings in Exparte Lange
and United States v. Benz are technically correct, the Court chose to ignore a
well-established principle spawned by dicta in both of the cases. The Court
observed that Lange stated simply that a trial judge may impose only a statu-
torily authorized sentence, while Benz stated that a trial judge had the power
to reduce a defendant's sentence after service had begun.80 In limiting the
Benz dictum to Lange's specific context,8 ' however, the Court ran roughshod
over dicta in those cases82 and others which stated that a trial court may not.
increase a validly imposed sentence once service of that sentence had begun.83
Furthermore, such cavalier treatment of these time-honored dicta cannot be
justified on Bozza's qualification of Benz.84 Bozza dealt with the issue of in-
creasing an invalid sentence and in no way addressed the issue of increasing a
valid sentence. Thus, Bozza does not disturb the Lange-Benz prohibition
against increasing validly imposed sentences.85
Finally, the DiFrancesco Court's analogy to the procedure upheld in
Swisher v. Brady86 invites criticism. The DiFrancesco Court lightly dismissed
the difference between an informal master's proceeding and a federal trial as
being "of no constitutional consequence."87 The Court failed to recognize,
however, that under the Maryland system the master has no authority to im-
pose sentences.88 As Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent, surely the
majority did not intend to characterize a federal trial judge's imposition of
78. Brief for Respondent at 2-9, United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980). Congress
attempted to circumvent this problem by providing for an automatic review of a defendant's con-
viction and sentence upon the taking of a review by the government. See note 8 supra. Such a
provision, however, is at most a forced consent.
79. 449 U.S. at 139.
80. Id. at 138. See text accompanying notes 56-63 supra.
81. 449 U.S. at 139.
82. See text accompanying notes 58 & 63 supra.
83. See cases cited note 63 supra.
84. See text accompanying notes 64-66 supra.
85. Indeed, several circuit courts have treated Bozza in precisely this manner. See, e.g., May-
field v. United States, 504 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Scott, 502 F.2d 1102 (8th Cir.
1974); United States v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 9 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974);
Thompson v. United States, 495 F.2d 1304 (Ist Cir. 1974); United States v. Mack, 494 F.2d 1204
(9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 916 (1975). Nevertheless, Bozza may provide precedential
support for the Court's holding in DiFrancesco. If DiFrancesco's initial sentence is regarded as
invalid because of the trial court's abuse of discretion in imposing it, Bozza mandates that the
sentence must be increased. The DiFrancesco Court, however, failed to make this argument.
86. 438 U.S. 204 (1978). See text accompanying notes 67-69 supra.
87. 449 U.S. at 141.
88. See Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 211-12 n.9 (1978) (quoting Md. R.P. 911).
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sentence as a "mere recommendation." 89 Logically extended, Swisher's ra-
tionale would define a federal trial as "a single proceeding which begins with a
[trial judge's] hearing and culminates in an adjudication by [an appellate
court]." 9 0
Criticism notwithstanding, the impact of DiFrancesco cannot be underes-
timated. With the appellate door now open, prosecutors will be free to appeal
a sentence whenever a defendant falls within the definition of a "dangerous
special offender."91 Although this freedom will not be without statutory re-
straint, 92 appeals pursuant to section 3576 possibly could deluge the already
overburdened appellate courts. Nevertheless, appellate review of sentences
imposed under the Dangerous Special Offender provisions could to a limited
extent provide a check on what has become a major problem in the criminal
justice system: lack of sentence uniformity.93
Moreover, DiFrancesco could have a profound impact on both existing
and future legislation. The Dangerous Special Drug Defender provision of
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 197094 practi-
cally mirrors the Dangerous Special Offender provisions. To date, the appeal
provision provided in section 849(h) of the Act-the counterpart of section
3576 9 5-has not been used by the government. In light of DiFrancesco, how-
ever, it will not be surprising to see a proliferation in the government's use of
this appeal provision. More importantly, section 3576 could be a forerunner
of a wide-ranging system of appellate review of all criminal sentences. Legis-
lation now pending in Congress would allow the government to appeal any
sentence that falls below that established by a set minimum guideline.96 The
timeliness of DiFrancesco is thus crucial in that it may well assuage Congress'
89. 449 U.S. at 152 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
90. 438 U.S. at 215. See text accompanying note 69 supra. Furthermore, the appellate proce-
dure in DiFrancesco conceivably could allow the prosecution a forbidden "second crack" at the
defendant, because review may incorporate facts outside the trial record.
The court of appeals on review of the sentence may, after considering the record, includ-
ing the entire presentence report, information submitted during the trial of such felony
and the sentencing hearing, and the findings and reasons of the sentencing court, affirm
the sentence, impose or direct the imposition of any sentence which the sentencing court
could originally have imposed, or remandforfurther sentencing proceedings and imposi.
tion of sentence ....
18 U.S.C. § 3576 (emphasis added).
91. See 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1976).
92. The government may appeal only when "the sentencing procedure employed [is]
[un]lawful, the findings made [are] clearly erroneous, or the sentencing court's discretion [is]
abused." 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1976).
93. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 918 (1980) ("Unwarranted disparity occurs
in the sentences imposed by judges in the same district and in sentences imposed from one district
or circuit in the Federal system to another."). See generally M. Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law
Without Order (1973); P. O'Donnel, M. Churgin & D. Curtis, Toward a Just and Effective Sen-
tencing System (1977). This argument was one of the underlying bases of the decision in
DiFrancesco. 449 U.S. at 142.
94. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 841-849 (1976)),
95. 21 U.S.C. § 849(h) is a verbatim replication of 18 U.S.C. § 3576.
96. Compare S. 1722, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. § 3725 (1979) (allowing government appeals of
sentences) with H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4101 (1980) (omitting any provision allowing
government appeals of sentences).
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doubts concerning the constitutionality of such legislation.97 Similarly,
DiFrancesco may give rise to the enactment of state statutes similar to section
3576. Thus far, no state has allowed its prosecutors to appeal a sentence uni-
laterally.98 But with the constitutionality of section 3576 now secure, states
may begin affording their prosecutors the same power as that enjoyed by their
federal counterparts.9 9
The Supreme Court rightly decided United States v. DiFrancesco, but not
without paying a high price. As the Court noted, the Dangerous Special Of-
fender provisions, including section 3576, represent a concentrated effort by
Congress to attack a specific problem in our criminal justice system. 1° ° Sec-
tion 3576 was enacted as a direct result of the lenient sentences imposed in
cases involving organized crime management personnel. 10 As a result of the
legal maze created by the double jeopardy cases, the Court was able to effectu-
ate Congress' intent by concocting a decision that rests precariously within the
bounds of stare decisis. Though the Supreme Court has in good faith at-
tempted to find its way through this maze, it has done nothing less than return
to the point from which it began. By failing to articulate a satisfactory theory
for "its conviction-acquittal distinction regarding double jeopardy, the
DiFrancesco Court has given life to a theory that it long ago rejected.' 0 2
DiFrancesco redefines double jeopardy, at least for defendants designated as
"dangerous special offenders," as "one continuing jeopardy from its beginning
to the end of the [appeal]."'1 3
JEFFREY NEIL ROBINSON
97. See S. 1722, 96th Con.&., 1st Sess. § 3725(b) (1979). Despite the Second Circuit's holding
in DiFrancesco, the Senate Judiciary Committee Report on S. 1722 noted that while the Commit-
tee disagreed with that holding, it modified its bill to provide that an initial sentence subject to
review is "provisional." S. Rep. No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1140 (1979). For a complete docu-
mentary tracing the American Bar Association's sinuous history concerning its position on govern-
ment appeals, see ABA Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Criminal Code, Report on Government
Appeal of Sentences, 35 Bus. Law. 617 (1980).
98. Several states allow appellate courts to increase sentences, but only upon the defendant's
motion for review. For a list of state statutes permitting such increases, see Note, Double Jeop-
ardy Limits on Prosecutorial Appeal on Sentences, 1980 Duke L.J. 847, 847 n.5.
99. This result assumes that the state constitution in question would allow government ap-
peals of sentences.
100. 449 U.S. at 142.
101. See S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 85-87 (1969), reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 4007-09.
102. See notes 51 & 70 supra.
103. Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 134 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See text ac-
companying note 3 supra.
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Civil Rights-Academic Freedom, Secrecy and Subjectivity as
Obstacles to Proving a Title VII Sex Discrimination Suit
in Academia
Sex discrimination in academic employment has been found to be both
appalling and blatant.' In 1958 the consensus of the academic community was
that "[w]omen scholars are not taken seriously and cannot look forward to a
normal professional career. ' 2 Since 1962 the federal government has at-
tempted to combat sexism in academic employment through three major stat-
utes3 and an executive order.4 The most important of these efforts was the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,5 which amended Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII originally exempted educational institu-
tions from the federal mandate forbidding employment discrimination. 6
When the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 was debated, however,
Congress concluded that public policy did not justify exemption of educa-
tional employees.from Title VII coverage.7 Senator Allen argued that to sub-
ject academic institutions to federal antidiscrimination legislation would be to
risk their academic freedom,8 but this argument was rejected by a substantial
margin.9
Despite the clear intent of Congress to eliminate sex discrimination in
1. The United States Congress has recognized the acute nature of the problem:
It is difficult to imagine a more sensitive area than educational institutions, where the
youth of the Nation are exposed to a multitude-of ideas and impressions that will
strongly influence their future development. To permit discrimination here would, more
than in any other area, tend to promote existing misconceptions and stereotyped catego-
rizations which in turn would lead to future patterns of discrimination.
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, Equal Employment Opportunities Enforcement Act
of 1971, S. Rep. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1971).
2. T. Caplow & R. McGee, The Academic Marketplace 226 (1958).
3. The three major pieces of antidiscrimination legislation are as follows: 1) the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (amending Civil Rights
Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)), which forbids em-
ployment discrimination by public and private educational institutions; 2) Education Amend-
ments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, §§ 901-907, 86 Stat. 235 (codifie4, as amended, at 20 U.S.C.§§ 1681-1686 (1976) and amending scattered sections of 29, 42 U.S.C.), which forbids discrimina-
tion under any educational program receiving federal funds; and 3) the Equal Pay Act of 1963,
Pub. L. No. 88-38,77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976)), which prohibits sex discrimi-
nation in employee remuneration.
4. Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 684 (1966-1970 Comp.) (amending Exec. Order No.
11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Comp.), which forbids employment discrimination by employers
holding government contracts.
5. Pub. L. No. 92-261,86 Stat. 103 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp.
III 1979)).
6. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701(b), 78 Stat. 241.
7. House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, Equal Employment Opportunities Enforcement Act
of 1971, H.R. Rep. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20, reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 2137, 2155.
8. 118 Cong. Rec. 946, 1993 (1972). Senator Allen was joined by Senator Ervin in his at-
tempts to have religious and academic institutions exempted from Title VII coverage. See id. at
1977-95.
9. Id. at 1995. The vote was 55-25.
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employment in federally funded institutions, courts have shown reluctance to
intervene in academic personnel decisions. 10 A number of cases have been
brought since antibias legislation was made applicable to colleges and univer-
sities in 1972.11 In the early cases, plaintiffs were generally denied relief. The
theme of the early decisions, as set forth in Green v. Board of Regents 12 and as
emphasized in Faro v. New York University,13 was that courts should abstain
from intervening in hiring, promotion, tenure and salary decisions made by
colleges and universities.
As the judiciary's experience with academic employment matters in-
creased, however, its articulated policy began to change. In January 1978 the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit decided Sweeney v. Board
of Trustees.14 In Sweeney a state college professor alleged sex discrimination
as the basis for her failure to obtain promotion at an earlier date and for the
disparity between salaries of males and females on the faculty. In backdating
Dr. Sweeney's promotion and concomitantly adjusting her salary for the inter-
vening years, the court voiced "misgivings over. . . [the recurrent] notion that
courts should keep 'hands off' the salary, promotion, and hiring decisions of
colleges and universities."' 5 The court acknowledged that decisions concern-
ing hiring, promotion and tenure rights require subjective evaluation and that
such evaluation can most appropriately be made in the academic setting but
cautioned against "permitting judicial deference to result in judicial abdica-
tion of a responsibility entrusted to the courts by Congress. That responsibil-
ity is simply to provide a forum for the litigation of complaints of sex
discrimination in institutions of higher learning as readily as for other Title
VII suits.' 16
10. E.g., State Div. of Human Rights v. Columbia Univ., 39 N.Y.2d 612, 619, 350 N.E.2d
396, 399, 385 N.Y.S.2d 19, 23 (1976); Pace College v. Commission on Human Rights, 38 N.Y.2d
28, 33, 339 N.E.2d 880, 884, 377 N.Y.S.2d 471, 478 (1975). See generally O'Neill, God and Gov-
ernment at Yale: The Limits of Federal Regulation of Higher Education, 44 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 525,
526 (1975). It is noteworthy that, in general, the most inefficient and ineffective strategy for
achieving an equal employment policy is litigation of individual cases, in part because judges vary
in their degree of commitment to equal employment. Ratner, Equal Employment for Women:
Summary of Themes and Issues, in Equal Employment Policy for Women 419,421 (R. Ratner ed.
1980).
11. E.g., Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904
(1977); Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1974); Green v. Board of Regents, 474
F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1973) (suit under § 1983); Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 435 F. Supp.
1328 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (dissolving preliminary injunction issued in 359 F. Supp. 1002 (W.D. Pa.
1973)); Peters v. Middlebury College, 409 F. Supp. 857 (D. Vt. 1976).
12. 474 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1973). A female associate professor claimed she was refused pro-
motion to full professor because of her sex. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that
"the University's standards are matters of professional judgement" and that the findings of the
trial court must be sustained unless clearly erroneous. Id. at 596.
13. 502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1974). A female Ph.D. was terminated from the university after
she refused to accept an appointment she regarded as a demotion. The court stated that "[o]f all
fields, which the federal courts should hesitate to invade and take over, education and faculty
appointments at a University level are probably the least suited for federal court supervision." Id.
at 1231-32.
14. 569 F.2d 169 (1st Cir. 1978).




In November 1978 the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania analogized academic institutions to industry in Kunda v.
Muhlenberg College.17 In Kunda a female college teacher alleged that sex dis-
crimination was the basis for the college's refusal to grant her promotion and
tenure. The court declared that "[t]he decision to grant or deny a promotion
to a college faculty member is not substantially different from a similar deci-
sion in business or industry."' 8 The court recognized that under Title VII the
"disparate treatment" theory of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green19 and the
"disparate impact" theory of International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States2" are applicable to academic institutions as well as to industry. 2' Ap-
plying these theories, the Kunda court concluded that the denial of tenure to
the female teacher was the result of the college's discriminatory acts in failing
to inform her that a master's degree was required for promotion.22 The court's
remedy was to mandate that the college should allow the female teacher two
years to complete the required degree and, upon completion, award her
tenure.2
3
Sweeney and Kunda are significant for their potential effect on challenges
to sex discrimination in academia. The Sweeney court expressly rejected the
prevailing abstention policy of Faro and was the first court specifically to or-
der promotion as the appropriate remedy when a female had been a victim of
discrimination in academia.24 The Kunda court was the first to present a thor-
ough, systematic analysis in which criteria used to evaluate the legality of em-
ployment decisions in industry were made applicable to employment decisions
in academia.
The United States Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the ap-
plicability of the academic freedom defense to enforcement of legislation en-
suring equal opportunity in appointment, promotion and tenure decisions. 25
17. 463 F. Supp. 294 (E.D. Pa. 1978), afld, 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1980).
18. Id. at 307.
19. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under the disparate treatment theory, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that the defendant's actions were based on a discriminatory motive. See text accompanying notes
29-38 infra.
20. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Discrimi-
natory motive is not an essential element under a disparate impact theory. The "plaintiff need
only show that the employment standards under scrutiny have a statistically significant discrimi-
natory impact." 463 F. Supp. at 307.
21. 463 F. Supp. at 306-07.
22. Id. at 313.
23. Id.
24. Broad, Ending Sex Discrimination in Academia, 208 Science 1120, 1121 (1980).
25. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), the United
States Supreme Court addressed the legality of race-conscious admissions programs. Justice Pow-
ell, announcing the judgment of the Court, cited with approval the four essential university free-
doms which Justice Frankfurter had expounded in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught,
and who may be admitted to study). 438 U.S. at 312. See notes 69-72 and accompanying text
infra. Justice Powell perceived that deciding who may be admitted to study may constitute a
constitutional interest protected by the first amendment but concluded that there are limits to the
exercise of this aspect of academic freedom. 438 U.S. at 314. In Justice Powell's view, academic
freedom could be used to justify a flexible admissions plan premised on many factors including
race and ethnic status. Id. In contradistinction, establishing a quota-type methodology for selec-
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It is reasonable, however, to anticipate that the Court would apply the criteria
set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green26 and in International Brother-
hood of Teamsters v. United States27 to evaluate an allegation of employment
discrimination brought against a college or university. Although these cases
involve industrial employers, lower federal courts have already applied their
reasoning in employment discrimination cases against academic institutions.28
If the McDonnell Douglas formula2 9 for evaluating discrimination in hir-
ing is applied, the female who alleges disparate treatment may establish a
prima facie case by proving that she is a member of a protected group, that she
applied and was qualified for a job for which the academic institution was
seeking applicants, that she was rejected despite her qualifications, and that
the academic institution continued to seek applicants from persons with her
qualifications. McDonnell Douglas does not require that the plaintiff provide
"direct proof of discrimination"; it merely requires a showing that "rejection
did not result from the two most common legitimate reasons on which an em-
ployer might rely to reject a job applicant: an absolute or relative lack of
qualifications or the absence of a vacancy in the job sought."'30 In accordance
with the McDonnell Douglas formula, a female denied promotion may estab-
lish a prima facie case of discrimination by proving that she was a faculty
member, that she was qualified for promotion, that she was considered for and
denied promotion, and that males with comparable qualifications were
granted promotion.31 A female denied tenure may establish a prima facie case
by showing the first three elements of a cause of action for discrimination in
promotion.32
After the female has established her prima facie case of discrimination in
tion of a student body to achieve educational diversity is not permissible even under the guise of
academic freedom. Thus, the Supreme Court did not permit academic freedom to be a defense for
discrimination. In Cannon v. The University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), a 43-year-old wo-
man brought a private suit alleging that rejection of her application for medical school was made
on the basis of sex. The Association of American Medical Colleges, in an amicus brief, argued
that to imply a private right to sue would be inconsistent with the constitutional interest in aca-
demic freedom. Association of American Medical Colleges Weekly Report #79-19, May 15, 1979.
The Supreme Court considered the academic protest to be a policy issue and held that the woman
had a right to bring a private suit in the federal courts.
26. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
27. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). See note 20 supra.
28. See notes 17-23 and accompanying text supra.
29. The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under the statute of
establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This may be done by showing (i)
that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
411 U.S. at 802.
30. 431 U.S. at 358 n.44.
31. Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 463 F. Supp. at 307.
32. Id. at 308. An additional requirement in a tenure case may be the showing that males
with similar qualifications were granted tenure during the time in which the female was consid-
ered or that there were significant procedural irregularities in the processing of the female's tenure
application. Id. See Huang v. College of the Holy Cross, 436 F. Supp. 639 (D. Mass. 1977);
EEOC v. Tufts Inst. of Learning, 421 F. Supp. 152 (D. Mass. 1975).
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hiring, promotion or granting of tenure, the academic institution has the bur-
den of presenting a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for the employment
decision." 33 If the institution rebuts the prima facie case, the female has the
burden of showing "that the defendant's stated reason. . . was pretextual"34
and that the disparate treatment to which she was subjected "constituted pur-
poseful discrimination on the basis of sex." 35
The ultimate burden of persuasion rests on the plaintiff.3 6 The academic
institution may attempt to hinder plaintiffs preparation of her case by resort-
ing to three major obstacles: (1) secrecy in decision-making processes;
(2) subjectivity in evaluation criteria; and (3) notions of academic freedom.
Direct evidence of sex discrimination will be rare because of the level of so-
phistication in academia. 37 Inferential proof of discriminatory motive may be
used, but the plaintiff must present that proof in her case.38
Academic decisions concerning appointment, promotion and tenure tra-
ditionally have been veiled in secrecy. Paralleling the increase in the number
of discrimination suits filed against colleges and universities has been an in-
crease in resistance on the part of academicians to revealing the bases for em-
ployment decisions.39 For example, in EEOC v. University of New Mexico,40
an associate professor alleged illegal discharge because of national origin and
sought access to personnel files during the preparation of his case. The univer-
sity refused to comply with a subpoena duces tecum requesting files of present
and previously terminated members of the college faculty. The United States
District Court for the District of New Mexico, however, ruled that the univer-
sity must produce the personnel files even though the college considered them
to be confidential and sensitive.41 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia also narrowed the use of secrecy in academic decision-making in
33. 463 F. Supp. at 309-10.
34. Id. at 310. Accord, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 804.
35. 463 F. Supp. at 311. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at
335 n.15.
36. Sweeney v. Board of Trustees, 569 F.2d at 177. See generally Divine, Women in the
Academy: Sex Discrimination in University Faculty Hiring and Promotion, 5 J.L. & Educ. 429
(1976).
37. 569 F.2d at 175. But see Broad, supra note 24, at 1121 (describing a situation in which a
University of Minnesota chemistry professor, as part of his evaluation of a female applicant for a
faculty position, declared in writing, "I have to state that she would have problems because she is
a woman. I guess I am a male chauvinist pig.").
38. 569 F.2d at 177.
39. Middleton, Academic Freedom vs. Affirmative Action: Ga. Professor Jailed in Tenure
Dispute, Chronicle of Higher Educ., Sept. 2, 1980, at 1, col. 2. See also Fields, The U.S. vs.
Berkeley over Affimnative Action, Chronicle of Higher Educ., Sept. 22, 1980, at 4, col. 1 (The
Labor Department's Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs has contended that the
University of California at Berkeley has "engaged in maneuver after maneuver frustrating investi-
gatory efforts." For example, the university has refused to reveal confidential letters of recom-
mendation to investigators in the Office of Civil Rights.). Cunningham & Brodie, Academic
Freedom & Tenure: St. Mary's College (California), 62 Am. Ass'n U. Professors Bull. 70, 74
(Spring 1976) (The President of the College "had received, and intended to follow, the advice of
his legal counsel not to give reasons so as to make it difficult for Professor Versluis to litigate
against the denial of tenure in a civil court suit.").
40. 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 653 (D.N.M. 1973), afid, 504 F.2d 1296 (10th Cir. 1974).
41. Id. at 654.
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State ex rel McLendon v. Morton .42 In McLendon an assistant professor al-
leged that she was denied due process when the college denied tenure. Mc-
Lendon had six years of full-time employment in academic teaching, thus
meeting the objective eligibility criteria enunciated by the college.43 The court
held that she had a sufficient entitlement to prohibit denial of tenure on the
issue of competency without procedural due process, including a notice of the
reasons for denial and an opportunity to rebut the evidence relevant to those
reasons.4
Academicians argue that destroying secrecy in academic employment de-
cisions chills candor in discussions and criticisms of colleagues' professional
competence.45 This argument, however, is of little merit. There is no evidence
of a chilling effect resulting from federal legislation requiring higher educa-
tional institutions to open their academic files to students.46 Furthermore, in-
creased openness would not increase liability for defamation since evaluations
made in good faith and as part of institutional responsibilities are privileged.47
Openness in decision-making processes would alleviate suspicion that employ-
ment decisions are based on impermissible reasons, and, such fears mitigated,
females would not feel compelled to resort to litigation for relief.48
Another obstacle facing the female alleging sex discrimination in aca-
demic employment is the use of subjective criteria in academic decisions con-
cerning appointment, promotion and tenure; the use of subjectivity makes it
difficult to prove discriminatory motive. The United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois pointed out in Lewis v. Chicago State Col-
lege49 that teaching ability is clearly a matter of subjective judgment.50 In
42. 249 S.E.2d 919, 925 (W. Va. 1978).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 926. A similar conclusion was reached by the United States Supreme Court in
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
45. See Gellhorn & Boyer, The Academy as a Regulated Industry, in Government Regula-
tion of Higher Education 25, 36-37 (W. Hobbs ed. 1978).
46. Id. at 40. The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g
(1976), provides that students who attend institutions of higher education must be given access to
their education records and must be provided an opportunity for a hearing to challenge informa-
tion in those records that is "inaccurate, misleading, or otherwise in violation of the privacy or
other rights of students." Id. § 1232g(a)(2). See generally Schatken, Student Records at Institu-
tions of Post-Secondary Education: Selected Issues Under the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act of 1974, 4 J.C. & U.L. 147 (1976-77).
47. See Stevens, Evaluation of Faculty Competence as a "Privileged Occasion," 4 J.C. &
U.L. 281 (1976-77). See also Rugenstein v. University of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 422 F. Supp. 61
(E.D. Wis. 1976) (not defamatory to call a professor an old biddy not suitable for promotion);
Keddie v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 412 F. Supp. 1264 (M.D. Pa. 1976) (not defamatory to evalu-
ate a professor as below average); Petroni v. Board of Regents, 115 Ariz. 562, 566 P.2d 1038 (1977)
(not defamatory for department head to make an unfavorable recommendation regarding promo-
tion and tenure); Byars v. Kolodiziej, 48 IML App. 3d 1015, 363 N.E.2d 628 (1977) (not defamatory
to say a professor does not deserve tenure). But see Dauterman v. State-Record Co., 249 S.C. 512,
154 S.E.2d 919 (1967) (defamatory to say a professor drinks excessively).
48. Van Alstyne, Furnishing Reasons for a Decision Against Reappointment: Legal Consid-
erations, 62 Am. Ass'n U. Professors Bull. 285, 285 (Summer 1976).
49. 299 F. Supp. 1357 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
50. "A professor's value depends upon his creativity ... his teaching ability, and numerous
other intangible qualities which cannot be measured by objective standards." Id. at 1359. See
also Fishbem, The Academic Industry-A Dangerous Premise, in Government Regulation of
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Peters v. Middlebury College5 l another district court permitted the use of sub-
jective criteria in an academic reappointment decision because "evaluation of
* . . teaching ability is necessarily a matter of judgment. '52 Judicial approval
of the use of subjective criteria is consistent with decisions involving use of
subjective evaluations in industrial settings. For example, in Rogers v. Interna-
tionalPaper Co. ,3 a nonacademic racial employment discrimination case, the
Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit ruled that subjective criteria were not
unlawful per se.54 Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in
the industrial case of Rowe v. General Motors Corp., , cautioned that subjec-
tive criteria provide "a ready mechanism for discrimination. '5 6
Because discriminatory practices can easily be disguised,57 the use of sub-
jective criteria has been one of the major obstacles for women in proving their
claims against academic institutions. The judiciary has been reluctant to inter-
ject its opinion into matters of promotion and tenure, preferring to "leave such
decisions to the Ph.D.'s in academia."'58 For example, the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, in Clark v. Whiting,59 refused to make a comparative
inquiry into either the quantity or the quality of the work of a male faculty
member who alleged an equal protection violation, stating that "courts may
not engage in 'second-guessing' the University authorities in connection with
faculty promotions." 60 This decision reflects the traditional belief that courts
should defer to the academician's judgment on qualifications for appointment,
promotion or tenure.61 At the same time, the'judiciary recognizes that sex
discrimination in academic employment cannot be prevented unless courts are
willing to become involved once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case. For
Higher Education 57, 62 (W. Hobbs ed. 1978) (a scholar cannot be evaluated by quantitative and
visible standards).
51. 409 F. Supp. 857 (D. Vt. 1976).
52. Id. at 868.
53. 510 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1975) (a civil rights action brought against a wood-paper mill
alleging racial discrimination in employment and promotion in skilled craft jobs).
54. Id. at 1345.
55. 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972) (blacks alleged racial discrimination in promotion and trans-
fer practices at auto plant).
56. Id. at 359.
57. Sweeney v. Board of Trustees, 569 F.2d at 175. "When overt discrimination becomes
illegal, it often goes underground in the beliefs of employers, labor leaders, educators, etc. Covert
forms of discrimination are traps that spring on women, like blacks, along paths marked by 'equal
opportunity' signs." M. Butler & W. Paisley, Women and the Mass Media 30 (1980). See gener-
ally Dipboye, Arvey & Terpstra, Sex and Physical Attractiveness of Raters and Applicants as
Determinants of Resume Evaluations, 62 J. Applied Psychology 288 (1977) (raters' evaluations of
applicants' resumes are affected by sex and physical attractiveness); Schmitt & Hill, Sex and Race
Composition of Assessment Center Groups as a Determinant of Peer and Assessor Ratings, 62 J.
Applied Psychology 261 (1977) (ratings of women appear to vary according to the proportion of
men in the evaluation group).
58. Broad, supra note 24, at 1121.
59. 607 F.2d 634 (4th Cir. 1979) (male associate professor sued university because of denial
of his request for promotion to full professor in violation of his equal protection and due process
rights).
60. Id. at 640.
61. See Green v. Board of Regents, 474 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1973) (academic standards are
matters of professional judgments); Lewis v. Chicago State College, 299 F. Supp. 1357 (N.D. III.
1969) (academic promotion decisions are not usually justiciable).
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example, the court in Clark stated that the judiciary may review a university's
evaluations of quantity and quality of scholarly work performed by a female
alleging sex discrimination. 62 And in Sweeney the court allowed several wit-
nesses to testify that Dr. Sweeney had been qualified for promotion several
years before it was granted by the university and that her qualifications had
not substantially changed between the time she was denied promotion and the
time, several years later, when she was granted promotion via normal univer-
sity peer review.63
A third major obstacle facing the female alleging sex discrimination by
colleges and universities is the notion of academic freedom. Academic free-
dom, aspracticed in American institutions,64 was adapted from the nineteenth
century German ideals of Lehrfreiheit (freedom to teach) and Lernfreiheit
(freedom to learn).6 5 Freedom to teach ensured that faculty could conduct
research independently and convey the results of that research, as well as
62. 607 F.2d at 640-41.
63. 569 F.2d at 178 n.18.
64. A senior member of the University of North Carolina faculty defined academic freedom
as the "removal of fear from independent thought: freedom to teach, to do research, to participate
in politics. With this freedom comes the ability to invent, to experiment, to test, to explore, to
disagree." Interview with Dr. Paul D. Brandes, Professor of Speech Communication, University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, in Chapel Hill, N.C. (Sept. 10, 1980).
An official statement, the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure,
was formulated by the Association of American Colleges and the American Association of Uni-
versity Professors (AAUP), and remains effective. It provides as follows:
Academic Freedom
(a) The teacher is entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of the
results, subject to the adequate performance of his other academic duties; but research
for pecuniary return should be based upon an understanding with the authorities of the
institution.
(b) The teacher is entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing his subject, but he
should be careful not to introduce into his teaching controversial matter which has no
relation to his subject. Limitations of academic freedom because of religious or other
aims of the institution should be clearly stated in writing at the time of the appointment.
(c) The college or university teacher is a citizen, a member of a learned profession, and
an officer of an educational institution. When he speaks or writes as a citizen, he should
be free from institutional censorship or discipline, but his special position in the commu-
nity imposes special obligations. As a man of learning and an educational officer, he
should remember that the public may judge his profession and his institution by his
utterances. Hence, he should at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate re-
straint, should show respect for the opinion of others, and should make every effort to
indicate that he is not an institutional spokesman.
Menard, "May Tenure Rights of Faculty be Bargained Away?", 2 J.C. & U.L. 256, 267 (1974-75).
Courts have frequently relied on this 1940 Statement and its interpretation by the AAUP in
deciding disputes arsing in the academic community. See, e.g., Browzin v. Catholic Univ. of Am.,
527 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (court upheld AAUP s interpretation of the "suitable position" rule
in the 1940 Statement); Adamian v. Jacobsen, 523 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1975) (appellate court ob-
served that a university regulation which allegedly was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad
had been adapted almost verbatim from the 1940 Statement; the court concluded that since the
regulation had been interpreted in an advisory letter by the AAUP "any overbreadth resulting in
facial invalidity" was eliminated); Starsky v. Williams, 353 F. Supp. 900 (D. Ariz. 1972), afl'd in
part, rev'd in part, 512 F.2d 109 (9th Cir. 1975) (district court referred to the requirements of
"appropriate restraint" contained in the 1940 Statement and held that certain language used by a
faculty member was not protected by the first amendment).
65. See R. Hofstedter & W. Metzger, The Development of Academic Freedom in the United
States 275 (1955); Nisbet, Max Weber and the Roots of Academic Freedom, in Controversies and
Decisions 103, 119-21 (C. Frankel ed. 1976).
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speak openly and freely of other matters, to their students. In Germany this
privilege was not extended to citizens outside the university, nor was it ex-
tended to faculty when they were outside the university.66 In the United
States, however, the federal constitution guarantees all persons the fundamen-
tal rights of Lehifreiheit and Lernfreiheit.67 Because of the fundamental differ-
ences in the individual liberties afforded citizens of Germany and the United
States, academic freedom in the United States has not been considered a right
independent of the laws of the land as it was in Germany.68 An academic
freedom interest, however, derived from the rights of association and expres-
sion guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and by the fourteenth amendment, was
expressly recognized in Sweezy v. New Hampshire.69
In Sweezy a faculty member refused to relate the content of a lecture he
had delivered at the university. The Supreme Court, in dicta, stated that
"[t]eachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to
evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding." 70 The Court feared that
state inquiry into a faculty member's teaching might chill the academic envi-
ronment. Justice Frankfurter wrote a forceful concurring opinion in which he
set forth "'the four essential freedoms' of a university-to determine for itself
on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study."71 Justice Frankfurter's remarks,
however, should not be interpreted to mean that academic freedom can be
used as a defense to all legislative or judicial intervention in academic mat-
ters.72 In Sweezy a faculty member's political autonomy was being invaded
and the countervailing state interests were minimal. Accordingly, resort to the
notion of academic freedom was appropriate.
66. R. Hofstedter & W. Metzger, supra note 65, at 389. See generally Fuchs, Academic Free-
dom-Its Basic Philosophy, Function, and History, 28 Law & Contemp. Probs. 431 (1963); Devel-
opments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1045 (1968).
67. Comment, Academic Freedom-Its Constitutional Context, 40 U. Colo. L. Rev. 600, 603
(1968).
68. "As a result of this constitutional 'incorporation,' the proposition that academic freedom
should be considered a right with independent character as it was in Germany has not been gener-
ally accepted as a sound legal principle in the United States." Id.
"As significant as academic freedom is in our American tradition, no court has squarely held
that academic freedom is a distinct and legally enforceable independent right absent and beyond
constitutional guarantees." Brown, Tenure Rights in Contractual and Constitutional Context, 6
J.L. & Educ. 279, 297 (1977). But see Murphy, Academic Freedom-An Emerging Constitutional
Right, 28 Law & Contemp. Probs. 447,455 (1963); Note, Academic Freedom and Federal Regula-
tion of University Hiring, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 879, 881 (1979).
69. 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
72. See id. at 265 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter stated:
Inquiry pursued in safeguarding a State's security against threatened force and violence
cannot be shut off by mere disclaimer. . . . But the inviolability of privacy belonging to
a citizen's political loyalties has so overwhelming an importance to the well-being of our
kind of society that it cannot be constitutionally encroached upon on the basis of so
meagre a countervailing interest of the State as may be argumentatively found in the
remote, shadowy threat to the security of New Hampshire allegedly presented in the
origins and contributing elements of the Progressive Party and in petitioner's relations to
these.
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Two years after Sweezy the United States Supreme Court ruled in Baren-
blatt v. United States73 that the House Committee on Un-American Activities
could investigate subversive activities in education. The Court was sensitive to
congressional intrusion into the constitutionally protected areas of "academic
teaching-freedom and its corollary learning-freedom" 74 but held that pub-
lic interest superseded individual and academic immunity.75 Subsequently, in
Shelton v. Tucker,76 the Supreme Court took the opportunity to articulate
clearly a two-pronged test for evaluating the appropriateness of the govern-
ment's intrusion into constitutionally protected personal liberties. According
to the Court the government purpose (1) must be legitimate and substantial
and (2) cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.77
In 1967, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,78 the Court declared that aca-
demic freedom is a "special concern of the First Amendment" and that laws
which cast a shadow over the robust exchange of ideas in the classroom would
not be tolerated.79 The following year, in Pickering v. Board of Education,80
the Supreme Court upheld a teacher's first amendment guarantee of freedom
of speech. Although such protection could have been included specifically
within the concept of academic freedom, the Court stated that the state had no
greater interest in monitoring the speech of the teacher-citizen than it did in
monitoring the speech of the citizenry in general. 81 In short, the Supreme
Court has generally been quick to vindicate the constitutional rights of acade-
micians. It has stricken loyalty-oath requirements as violative of the first
amendment 82 and promoted autonomy by prohibiting restrictions on curricu-
lum and activities. 83 Academicians have been further protected by the Court's
73. 360 U.S. 109 (1959). During interrogation before a congressional committee, Barenblatt
refused to answer questions concerning his political or religious beliefs, as well as other personal
and private affairs. His refusal was based on the first amendment specifically and on academic
freedom in general.
74. Id. at 112.
75. Id. at 124-34.
76. 364 U.S. 479 (1960). A state statute required teachers to file an affidavit annually listing
the organizations to which they belonged or regularly contributed during the preceding five years;
the Supreme Court held that such forced disclosures impaired a person's right of free association.
77. Id. at 488.
78. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
79. Id. at 603.
80. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). The Court held that speaking on issues of public importance may
not be used as the basis for dismissing a teacher from his teaching position.
81. Id. at 568.
82. In Whitehall v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967), plaintiff who was offered a teaching position at
the University of Maryland, challenged the constitutionality of a state loyalty-oath requirement.
The Supreme Court stated, "We are in the First Amendment field. The continuing surveillance
which this type of law places on teachers is hostile to academic freedom." Id. at 59-60. But see
Connell v. Higgenbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971), in which a primary school teacher was dismissed
from her job for refusing to sign a loyalty oath. The Court ruled that requiring all teachers to
fledge to support the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Florida is acceptable.
Id. at 208.
83. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Court struck down a state law that for-
bade teaching any modem language other than English to children below the eighth grade. The
Supreme Court did not mention academic freedom per se but stated that "[tlhe American people
have always regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance
1982]
NORTH CAROLINA LAWREVIEW
recognition of their freedom of association rights,8 4 due process rights in dis-
missal proceedings8 5 and freedom of speech rights in political activity.8 6
Since federal antidiscrimination legislation was made applicable to col-
leges and universities in 1972, both academicians and nonacademicians have
become increasingly alarmed by what they allege is an infringement of aca-
demic freedom by the federal government. The presidents of four leading uni-
versities in Washington, D.C., have asserted that "government interference is
disrupting higher education to a point where institutional autonomy is seri-
ously threatened."8 7 The president of the National Academy of Science has
told members of the academy that there is a conflict between academic excel-
lence and equal opportunity.88 A faculty member of the University of Geor-
which should be diligently promoted." Id. at 400. The Court considered the state law to "materi-
ally. . . interfere with the calling of modem language teachers" and reversed the state supreme
court's holding of its constitutionality. Id. at 401.
In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), a secondary school teacher challenged the con-
stitutionality of a state law that made it unlawful for a teacher in a state-supported academic
institution to teach evolution. The Supreme Court did not discuss academic freedom but held the
law unconstitutional as a violation of the fourteenth amendment as it embraces the first amend-
ment's prohibition of state laws establishing a religion. In White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533
P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975), police officers posed as students and enrolled in the state
university. They engaged in covert practice of recording class discussions, compiling police dos-
siers and intelligence reports. Without discussing academic freedom, the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia stated, "als a practical matter the presence in a university classroom of undercover officers
taking notes to be preserved in police dossiers must inevitably inhibit the exercise of free speech
both by professors and students." Id. at 767, 533 P.2d at 229, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
84. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). University faculty members alleged
that the state's teacher loyalty laws and regulations were unconstitutional. The Supreme Court
stated, "[olur Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcen-
dent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a
special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy
over the classroom." Id. at 603.
85. Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956). An associate professor was summarily
discharged because he refused to answer questions concerning his membership in the Communist
Party on the grounds that his answers might tend to incriminate him. The New York City Charter
provided for termination of employment under such circumstances. The Supreme Court did not
discuss academic freedom but merely held that the teacher's summary dismissal violated the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), a college teacher who had been employed for
four successive years under a series of one-year contracts was, dismissed. The Supreme Court
concluded that he may have a sufficient property interest to warrant a due process hearing during
which he could be informed of the grounds for dismissal and allowed to challenge the sufficiency
of those grounds. But see Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), in which a teacher was
hired by the university for one academic year. He was not rehired the next year. The Supreme
Court held that under the circumstances he did not have a property interest in being rehired
sufficient to require a due process hearing.
86. Picketing v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). A teacher was dismissed because he
wrote a letter published in a local newspaper criticizing the school board's allocation of school
funds. Not addressing academic freedom per se, the Supreme Court stated that "it cannot be
gainsaid that the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that
differ significantly from those of the citizenry in general. The problem in any case is to arrive at a
balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees." Id. at 568.
87. Lacovara, How Far Can the Federal Camel Slip Under the Academic Tent?, 4 J.C. &
U.L. 223, 224 (1976-77).
88. Broad, supra note 24, at 1121-22. Dr. Philip Handler, president of the National Academy
of Science, stated:
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gia alleged academic freedom as the reason for his refusal to obey a court
order requiring him to reveal the bases for his vote on the promotion and
tenure of a female assistant professor.89 The University of California at
Berkeley refused to provide confidential letters of recommendation to civil
rights investigators in the Department of Labor.90
Academicians have resisted review of their employment practices by ar-
guing that such review violates their academic freedom.9 ' Historically, acade-
micians have enjoyed independence from regulation far greater than their
counterparts in industry.92 This independence is based on the premise that
educators must be afforded autonomy in teaching, research, and publishing in
order to preserve freedom and integrity of thought.93 External supervision of
employment decisions, however, in no way interferes with a faculty member's
privilege of teaching, conducting research or publishing, the areas traditionally
protected by academic freedom. In contradistinction, an institution's refusal
to hire, promote or grant tenure to a female because of her sex directly inter-
feres with that female's privilege of teaching, conducting research and publish-
ing and is a definite violation of her academic freedom. Furthermore, even
The government has sought and obtained university records concerning the details of
individual faculty appointments--explicit affirmation by government that it considers
other criteria to be as significant as academic competence, if not more so, in apointments
to the faculty. Yet nothing can so damage the future of a university as an appointment
to the faculty of anyone less than the best whom the university might otherwise have
attracted to its company.
Id. at 1122.
89. Middleton, supra note 39, at 1, col. 2. Professor James Dinnon, under the pretext of
academic freedom, disobeyed a court order to reveal how he voted and the bases for his vote on
the promotion and tenure of Dr. Maija S. Blaubergs. On July 3, 1980, when Mr. Dinnon surren-
dered himself to initiate his three-month jail term, he wore full academic regalia to demonstrate
that "in effect, the federal government will be locking up the University of Georgia." Id. Dr.
Blaubergs had filed suit for violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
90. Fields, supra note 39, at 4, col. 1. The University of California at Berkeley continued its
refusal to reveal confidential letters of recommendation to the Office of Civil Rights investigators,
and the Department of Labor threatened to deny the university $25 million in federal contracts.
9 1. But see McGill, Is Federal Regulation a Threat to Academic Freedom?, Columbia To-
day, March 1977, at 2, 34-36. President McGill of Columbia University acknowledged that the
principle of federal regulation is not a threat to academic freedom-he claims the threat is the
regulators.
92. See Winder, Government Rulemaking: Any Hope for Simplification?, Chronicle of
Higher Education, Dec. 20, 1976, at 5, col. 5.
93. Brown, supra note 68, at 300. See also Searle, Two Concepts of Academic Freedom, in
The Concept of Academic Freedom 86 (E. Pincoffs ed. 1975). However, faculties must accept
specific teaching responsibilities and must conform classroom teaching to the subject matter
promulgated in the course description. Libelous or obscene writing is not protected even when
presented as a work of scholarship. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
The traditional definition of academic freedom has recently been expanded to encompass
institutional autonomy and faculty self-rule. J. Fleming, G. Gill & D. Swinton, The Case for
Affirmative Action for Blacks in Higher Education 84 (1978).
[T]his expanded meaning of academic freedom translates largely into a direct attack on
only one government regulation: affirmative action. No other type of government regu-
lation or legislation that is applicable to higher education-pension rights and retirement
benefits, health and safety regulations, equal student aid and veterans benefits, and stu-




assuming that the institution's academic freedom is invaded and that such
freedom is a constitutionally protected liberty, the government's intrusion is
permissible under the Shelton test. 94 The goal of ensuring that jobs in
academia are assigned on the basis of merit is legitimate. Moreover, the gov-
ernment's means of accomplishing this goal does not broadly stifle personal
liberties, and the goal cannot be achieved by a more narrow means, such as
requesting voluntary nondiscrimination.
Although the status of women in academic institutions has improved
since antidiscrimination legislation was enacted,95 an unjustified disparity
continues to exist between female and male faculty members. For example,
seventy-two percent of men, but only forty-six percent of women, hold tenured
appointments, 96 and female scientists are paid approximately seventeen per-
cent less than their male colleagues at all faculty levels.97 Despite the contin-
ued inequalities, the judiciary has been conservative in its response to
allegations of sex discrimination in academia. During the past three years,
however, the courts have developed standards, analogous to those applicable
in industry, for evaluating alleged discriminatory acts. The courts delve be-
hind the college's or university's final decision, inquire into the reasons for the
decision, and scrutinize the bases on which the decision was made. But the
judiciary refrains from acting as a "super-tenure" committee imposing its own
evaluations of a female's qualifications for academic appointment, promotion
or tenure. The court's aim is not to impose its own judgment concerning who
will hold academic appointments but rather to ensure that academic employ-
ment decisions are not based on illegal sexually-discriminatory reasons. Such
action by our courts is both necessary and appropriate.
R. JOYCE BURRISS GARRETT
94. See notes 76-77 and accompanying text supra.
95. See Greenberger, The Effectiveness of Federal Laws Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in
Employment in the United States, in Equal Employment Policy For Women 108 (R. Ratner ed.
1980).
96. Status Improves for Women Scientists in Academe, Chemical and Engineering News,
May 7, 1979, at 6.
97. Comm. on the Educ. and Employment of Women in Science and Eng'r, Comm'n on
Human Resources, U.S. Nat'l Research Council, Climbing the Academic Ladder: Doctoral Wo-
men Scientists in Academe (1979).
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